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Abstract 
 
 
 This dissertation consists of three essays that empirically investigate the role of 
regulatory pressures, voluntary 33/50 program and information spillover on firms’ environmental 
performance. First, we examine the extent to which participating in the 33/50 program led to a 
reduction in 33/50 releases. Second, we examine the extent to which program participation 
motivated the adoption of Pollution Prevention (P2) technology, and whether learning from peers 
increased the adoption of P2 technology by a facility after controlling for the effects of program 
participation and regulatory pressures. Last, we examine the extent to which program 
participation caused an increase in recycling and whether the adoption of P2 technology was 
inversely related to changes in recycling and releases of 33/50 chemicals. To answer these 
questions, we use facility-level information on program participation, toxic emissions and P2 
adoption for more than 7000 facilities that were eligible for the program over the period of 1988-
1995. We find that program participants had 14.8% to 23.7% higher rate of reduction in 33/50 
releases than non-participants, after controlling for industry effects, time trend and other 
regulatory pressures. We also find that program participants on average adopted 1-1.2 more P2 
technologies than non-participants for 33/50 chemicals, but did not significantly increase the 
number of P2 technologies adopted for other TRI chemicals. Additionally, the adoption of P2 
was positively affected by information spillovers from other facilities in the same industry. 
Although program participants adopted more P2 technologies for 33/50 chemicals, the effects of 
P2 on recycling and releases of 33/50 chemicals were not statistically significant.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Pollution control in the U.S. has been achieved mainly through a command and control 
regulatory system. Difficulties in developing regulations to control numerous pollutants emitted 
by firms have led to an interest in using more cost effective incentive-based policy instruments to 
promote green stewardship among firms. One of these instruments is information disclosure 
through the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). TRI was established in 1986, under the provisions 
of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), to provide publicly 
available information on toxic chemicals. “Manufacturing facilities included in SIC codes 20 
through 39 are required to submit an annual toxic chemical release report that includes locations 
and quantities of chemicals stored on-site, transferred to various facilities and released to 
environmental media under the following conditions: if they have 10 or more full-time 
employees and if they manufacture, process, or use specified chemicals in amounts greater than 
threshold quantities”1 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004). The US EPA compiles 
these reports and makes them publicly available. The current TRI database contains chemical, 
media, and location-specific information for 666 toxic chemicals across seven industry sectors2, 
and has been widely used by economic analysts as one indicator of a firm’s environmental 
performance (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008; Hamilton, 1998; Khanna, 2001). Existing studies show 
that the public information disclosure of TRI has increased the visibility of polluters, and thus 
created incentives for firms to undertake voluntary efforts to reduce pollution in order to appeal 
to green consumers and shareholders and to avoid regulatory scrutiny (Arora and Cason, 1996; 
                                                 
1 Process more than 25,000 pounds in aggregate and use more than 10,000 pounds of any TRI chemicals. 
2 http://www.epa.gov/TRI/trichemicals/index.htm; facilities from four more industry sectors were added in 1998. 
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Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Khanna, 2001; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Sam, 2009; Sam et al., 
2009).  
In addition to EPCRA, the US Congress passed the National Pollution Prevention Act 
(PPA) of 1990. It recognizes the limitations of the existing environmental regulatory framework 
that emphasizes media-specific end-of-pipe pollution control and seeks to promote a more 
holistic approach to controlling pollution through Pollution Prevention (P2). The PPA also 
declares the preferred approach in the pollution control hierarchy to be P2. Specifically, it states 
that “pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source whenever feasible, pollution that 
cannot be prevented should be recycled in an environmentally safe manner whenever feasible, 
pollution that cannot be prevented or recycled should be treated in an environmentally safe 
manner, and disposal or other release into the environment should only be employed as the last 
resort and should be conducted in an environmentally safe manner”(U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1990). Though P2 has received greater policy emphasis, the adoption of P2 
technology remains voluntary. To measure the progress in reducing wastes through P2, the PPA 
has required additional reporting of waste management and source reduction activities at a 
chemical and facility- specific level in the TRI. Following the passage of the PPA, the EPA also 
established a P2 information clearinghouse to facilitate the exchange of information.  
Another mechanism to encourage the P2 ethic and accomplish pollution reduction is 
through public voluntary environmental programs. The 33/50 program was the first public 
voluntary program introduced by the EPA. It targeted at 17 toxic chemicals listed in the TRI that 
were widely used by US manufactures. The 33/50 refers to the goal of the program that was to 
reduce the national aggregate releases of the 17 chemicals by 33% by 1992 and by 50% by 1995. 
The program provided public recognition on participants’ voluntary efforts to reduce those 
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otherwise unregulated pollutants. It not only gave flexibility to the participants on the methods 
and extent of reduction achieved, it also sought to instill a P2 ethic among firms by encouraging 
them to modify their production process, substitute input chemicals, and adopt practices to 
reduce their emissions through source reduction (Khanna, 2006).  
Existing studies have focused on the 33/50 program because it is the first public 
voluntary program and its outcome is measurable through the TRI. Most research agrees that the 
33/50 program provided incentives to firms to undertake pollution control efforts, in order to 
signal good faith to the regulators, to appeal to green consumers, and to avoid boycotts (Arora 
and Cason, 1996; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Innes and Sam, 2008; Khanna and Damon, 1999; 
Sam, et al., 2009; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). However, empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of the 33/50 program in reducing toxic releases has been mixed 
(Khanna and Brouhle, 2009). The mixed evidence on the effectiveness of the 33/50 program has 
led to the arguments against voluntary programs in general. The key arguments are that programs 
participants took credit for what they would have done anyway in the absence of the programs. 
In other words, voluntary programs have not caused changes in firms’ environmental behaviors.  
Some scholars have recently proposed that eliminating voluntary programs from the 
policy options may be premature. It could be the case that the best environmental practices had 
been disseminated from participants to non-participants, which made comparing the pollution 
reduction between program participants and non-participants difficult (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007). 
They suggest that policy makers may design voluntary programs to enhance such potential 
dissemination of pollution prevention technology in the future.  
 While the 33/50 program is the most studied voluntary program, this dissertation 
improves the understanding of the role of voluntary programs in reducing pollution and 
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promoting the adoption of environmental technology in the following ways. First, existing 
studies have used data aggregated at the firm level or assumed that all facilities were program 
participants if their parent companies participated in the program. However, only 20% of the 
facilities belonging to participating firms actually participated in the program, indicating great 
heterogeneity among facilities within the same parent company. In this dissertation, we relax this 
assumption made by the previous studies and re-evaluate the effectiveness of the 33/50 program 
using facility-level information on program participation and toxic emissions. We show that 
using the assumption made by previous studies leads to attenuated estimates of program impacts. 
Thus, we contribute to the research by showing the importance of conducting the analysis at a 
highly disaggregated level.  
Second, the 33/50 program was established to promote the P2 ethic among firms, but 
none of the existing studies have examined the extent to which participating in the 33/50 
program had induced the adoption of P2 technology and whether program participants motivated 
their neighboring facilities to adopt P2 technology. Furthermore, unlike end-of-pipe technologies 
that are more likely to be available off the shelf, P2 includes modification of production 
processes and substitution of toxic with non-toxic or less toxic materials. These activities are 
more likely to be operation and facility-specific. These operational challenges could increase the 
search and information costs thus discourage the adoption of P2 technology. However, other 
facilities’ experience on the adoption of P2 technology could reduce the informational costs, thus 
promote the adoption of P2 through information spillovers. This is the first study to investigate 
the role of information spillovers in motivating the adoption of P2. We contribute to the literature 
by examining the extent to which the adoption of P2 technology was motivated by prior P2 
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experience of peer facilities and examine whether higher levels of program participation by 
neighboring facilities motivated P2 adoption.  
Third, while the existing studies on the 33/50 program have focused on the incentives for 
participation and the effectiveness of the program, few have examined the mechanisms through 
which the reduction of 33/50 emissions was achieved. Program participants might have used P2 
to reduce emissions at source or used other abatement methods that could result in an increase in 
recycling. Though the use of the recycling method is preferable to direct on-site releases of toxic 
chemicals, it is lower in the pollution control hierarchy than P2. An increase in recycling could 
indicate that program participants did not undertake fundamental changes in their environmental 
management practices, but simply shifted the pollutants from direct release to recycling facilities 
despite the emphasis of the 33/50 program on P2. This dissertation fills the gap in the literature 
gap by examining the mechanisms by which firms reduced their 33/50 releases; whether by 
recycling or prevention at source.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 evaluates the effectiveness 
of the 33/50 program in reducing toxic releases of the 33/50 chemicals. Chapter 3 examines the 
extent to which the adoption of P2 technology was motivated by the 33/50 program and whether 
prior P2 experience of peers increased the adoption of P2 technology. Chapter 4 examines the 
extent to which program participation led to changes in recycling and whether P2 adoption led to 
reduction in releases and increase in recycling of 33/50 chemicals. Chapter 5 summarizes 
findings and provides policy implications.   
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Chapter 2 Re-assessment of the Impact of EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 
Program on Toxic Releases 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Pollution control in the U.S. has typically relied on command-and-control environmental 
regulations that are costly to enact, monitor and enforce. Since the 1990s there has been greater 
emphasis on voluntary programs to reduce releases of unregulated pollutants, such as toxic 
releases in an effort to find less adversarial and more cost-effective approaches to reduce toxic 
pollution that can be implemented without legislative delays. This followed the passage of the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, which required manufacturing 
facilities to report their annual on-site releases and off-site transfers of specified toxic chemicals 
to the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Though firms are not penalized for reporting large TRI 
emissions, the public disclosure of TRI has raised awareness among regulators and the public 
about the magnitude of the toxic pollution problem and imposed reputational costs on firms 
listed as large toxic polluters (Hamilton, 1998). 
The 33/50 program was the first voluntary program established by the U.S. EPA. It was 
established in 1991 with the goal of reducing the aggregate releases of 17 toxic chemicals3 by 
33% by 1992 and by 50% by 1995, relative to the level in 1988. Firms had flexibility in the 
extent of reduction they achieved and in the methods they chose to reduce their releases. 
Observed data suggest that the program was successful in attracting participation from 1294 
companies, which is 13% of all eligible firms. Those participating companies generated more 
                                                 
3 The 17chemicals are: 1,1,1-trichloroethane, benzene, cadmium & cadmium compounds, carbon tetrachloride, 
chloroform, chromium and chromium compounds, cyanide compounds, dichloromethane, lead and lead compounds, 
mercury and mercury compounds, methyl ethyl ketone, methyl isobutyl ketone, nickel and nickel compounds, 
tetrachloroethylene, toluene, trichloroethylene, and xylenes. 1,1,1-trichloroethane and carbon tetrachloride are 
classified as ozone depleting substances (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997). 
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than 60% of releases of 33/50 chemicals (hereafter referred to as 33/50 releases) in the U.S. in 
1988. The EPA reported that the aggregate releases of 33/50 chemicals declined by 55% by 1995 
relative to 1988 with 72% of this reduction occurring after 1991, suggesting that the program 
exceeded its goals (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997).  
The extent to which this reduction is attributed to program participation can, however, be 
questioned for several reasons. First, two of the 17 chemicals were considered ozone depleting 
(OD) chemicals and were going to be phased out by 1996 under the Montreal Protocol. The 
anticipated regulation could have created incentives for some firms to achieve early reductions 
even in the absence of the 33/50 program. Second, by using 1988 as the baseline for measuring 
emissions reductions, the program created incentives for firms that had already achieved 
reductions prior to the 33/50 program to participate and obtain credit for those reductions. These 
firms may have initiated actions to reduce releases prior to participation following negative 
publicity accompanying the public disclosure of TRI data that was independent of their program 
participation decision.  
Several studies have examined the effectiveness of the 33/50 program in reducing 33/50 
releases but yielded mixed results (discussed in the next section). The purpose of this paper is to 
re-assess the impact of the 33/50 program on 33/50 releases using data on program participation 
at the facility level for all eligible facilities for the 1988-1995 period. We use a panel data 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework to incorporate the facility-specific 
unobserved effects, potentially endogenous program participation decision and the dynamics of 
pollution generation. In undertaking this analysis we control for any time trend in emissions and 
for the synergistic effects of other regulations. We examine the effects of the program on all 
33/50 chemicals and separately for the OD and non-OD chemicals. We also consider its impact 
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on the toxicity weighted releases of 33/50 chemicals. 
In addition to using the GMM framework, this study differs from existing studies in 
several ways. First, we examine the impact of the 33/50 program using data on participation at 
the facility level. This is in contrast to other studies that were conducted at firm level and/or 
assume that all facilities belonging to a participating parent company participated in the program. 
The EPA considered a parent company as a program participant, as long as it had at least one 
facility participating in the program. Our information on facility level participation reveals that 
only 23% of the facilities belonging to 33/50 companies actually participated in the program. We 
find that 553 out of the 1203 participating firms had multiple plants. These multi-plant firms had 
25 facilities on average; of these only 3 facilities participated in the program, on average. Only 
30 out of the 553 multi-plant firms had all their facilities participated in the program. As 
discussed below, we find that only 1,335 facilities out of the 5,595 facilities that belong to the 
33/50 parent companies actually participated in the 33/50 program (hereafter 33/50 facilities). 
Earlier papers have thus overestimated the number of facility participants by more than four-fold. 
Second, our data include a much larger sample of eligible facilities compared to previous studies 
that have focused on S&P 500 firms or on certain industries. Third, we examine if the program’s 
impact on the two OD chemicals differed from that for the non OD chemicals.  
2.2 Related Literature  
Several papers have sought to explain the incentives for participation in voluntary 
programs and their effectiveness in improving environmental performance (see reviews in 
(Khanna and Brouhle, 2009) and (Alberini and Segerson, 2002; Khanna, 2001)). These studies 
show that regulatory pressures, due to current and anticipated regulations, as well as the threat of 
environmental liabilities motivated firms to participate in the 33/50 program (Arora and Cason, 
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1995; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Innes and Sam, 2008; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Sam, et al., 
2009)). Pressure from the firm’s stakeholders, such as consumers, communities and 
environmental interest groups, also created incentives for participation in the 33/50 program to 
improve the environmental reputation of the firm (Arora and Cason, 1996; Gamper-Rabindran, 
2006; Innes and Sam, 2008; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Sam, et al., 2009; Videras and Alberini, 
2000; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). Studies also show that firms that were included in the first 
group invited by the EPA to participate in the 33/50 program (because they were among the 
largest emitters of 33/50 chemicals) were more likely to participate in the program (Arora and 
Cason, 1996; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Innes and Sam, 2008; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Sam, 
et al., 2009). Evidence of free-rider behavior by firms that had achieved reduction in releases 
prior to the start of the 33/50 program in 1991 is mixed. Vidovic and Khanna (2007) find that 
firms that had achieved a larger absolute reduction in their 33/50 releases during 1988-1990 were 
more likely to participate in the program. Gamper-Rabindran (2006) finds this to be the case only 
in some sectors. Innes and Sam (2008), Sam et al. (2009), Khanna and Damon (1999) and Arora 
and Cason (1996) find no evidence of free-rider behavior.   
Studies that analyze the effectiveness of the 33/50 program are reviewed in Khanna and 
Brouhle (2009). Khanna and Damon (1999) study the impact of program participation on the 
chemical sector and find that the expected reduction of 33/50 releases that can be attributed to 
program participation is 27.92% relative to the pre-program level over the period of 1991-93. 
Vidovic and Khanna (2007) examine the effects of the program over the period 1991-95 for a 
broader set of sectors and argue that participation in the program had no effect if prior reductions 
in pollution achieved before the start of the program and time and fixed-effects are taken into 
account. However, Innes and Sam (2008) find that 33/50 participation significantly reduces 
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33/50 releases as well as toxicity weighted 33/50 releases, even after controlling for time and 
industry effects, with the statistically significant reduction occurring at the start of the program in 
1991-1992. They estimate that the cumulative reduction in 33/50 releases over the period of 
1991-1995 due to the program is over 45% of the average emissions of participants in year 1990. 
More recently, Sam et al. (2009) find that even after controlling for other voluntary activities a 
firm might undertake, such as adoption of Total Quality Environmental Management, program 
participation had a statistically significant negative impact on 33/50 releases not only during the 
program years but also over the 1996-1998 period, after it ended. Gamper-Rabindran (2006) 
focuses only on the 15 non-ozone depleting chemicals, arguing that the two OD chemicals were 
due to be phased out anyway under the Montreal Protocol. She conducts industry-specific 
analysis and finds that the impact of the program on 33/50 releases and health-indexed 33/50 
releases from the 15 chemicals varied by industry and media. The program’s impact on 33/50 
releases ranged between -51% in the fabricated metal sector to +170% in the chemical sector 
over the period of 1991-1995. Similarly, the program’s effects on toxicity weighted releases 
differ across industries, ranging from -390% in the fabricated metal sector to +110% in the 
chemical sector. The analysis, however, does not shed light on the reasons for these differing 
impacts of the program across industries. The broad conclusion from this literature appears to be 
that, at least in some sectors, the 33/50 program led to reduction in releases.  
These studies have examined the impact of participation using firm-level data that 
considers a firm as a participant if even one facility of that firm participates in the program. 
Gamper-Rabindran (2006) analyzes the effectiveness of participation at the facility level but 
assumes that all facilities belonging to a participating parent company (hereafter 33/50 
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companies) participated in the program 4. Additionally, these studies have modeled participation 
decisions using probit models with cross sectional information about participation in the first 
year of the program,1991/1992 (Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Innes and Sam, 2008).5 Similarly, 
Vidovic and Khanna (2007) assume that all participants joined in 1991. Unlike these studies, 
Khanna and Damon (1999) estimate a cross sectional probit model but incorporate information 
on program participation for each year from 1991 to 19936. In this paper, we use firm-specific 
information on the time of participation to obtain the time of participation for each facility. We, 
however, assume that the facilities participated at the same time as their parent companies. We 
then use a pooled probit model with clustering at the facility level to estimate the program 
participation decision. We also examine if the effect of the program differed over the five years 
and whether the program continued to have an effect after 1995.  
Previous studies on effectiveness of this program have used a two-step procedure to 
correct for self-selection into the program. Program participation is modeled using a probit 
model and the fitted probability or inverse mills ratio is included directly in the second step 
estimation on 33/50 releases (Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Innes and Sam, 2008; Khanna and 
Damon, 1999; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). To obtain consistent parameter estimates for the 
program outcome regression, the first-step participation model needs to be correctly specified 
(Angrist, 2001) and the standard errors in the outcome equation need to be corrected using 
boostrapping procedures (Innes and Sam, 2008; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). We avoid these 
                                                 
4 The sample analyzed by Gamper-Rabindran consists of 3261 facilities and is much smaller than that used in this 
paper which includes 8756 facilities. 
5 Gamper-Rabindran (2006) defines a 0/1 dummy variable (equal to one for a participant and zero otherwise) for 
year 1991. Innes and Sam (2008) estimate the program participation decision for year 1992. Instead of including the 
participation variable as 0/1 variable for year 1992 only, they construct four participation variables in the releases 
model. Each of these is defined as a 0/1 variable for a firm for each of the remaining years of the program (1992-
1995), thus they measure the incremental effect of each year’s participation on 33/50 releases.  
6 The cross sectional data set is compiled such that firms are eliminated from the subsequent years once they 
participated in the program. 
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concerns by using the predicted probability of participation as an instrumental variable in the 
second-step outcome regression (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Furthermore, previous studies have either excluded the releases of the two OD chemicals 
(Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Sam, et al., 2009) (implicitly assuming all reduction of OD chemicals 
were due to the mandatory phase-out), or aggregated all 17 chemicals (assuming the impact of 
the 33/50 program is the same across the OD and non-OD chemicals). In contrast, we include 
specifications that consider the two groups of chemicals separately to examine any differential 
effect of the program across chemicals. In one specification we also compare the effects of 
mandatory regulations (under the Montreal Protocol) to those of the voluntary 33/50 program on 
33/50 releases.   
2.3 Empirical Framework 
Our empirical analysis is based on the premise that a rational facility chooses its level of 
pollution generation and whether or not to participate in a voluntary program, such as the 33/50 
program, simultaneously. There are several reasons why it could be motivated to participate in 
the 33/50 program and/or voluntarily reduce its toxic releases. These include a desire to preempt 
more stringent regulations, to signal good faith effort to regulators and public, and to obtain 
public recognition for participation and reduce the negative publicity due to disclosure of its 
toxic releases in the TRI. Therefore, bigger polluters that face greater regulatory pressures and 
compliance costs are more likely to participate in the program (Innes and Sam, 2008; Khanna 
and Damon, 1999; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). Participation, however, does not guarantee that a 
facility will actually reduce its 33/50 releases, since a participant was neither required to commit 
to any particular level of reduction nor penalized for not making any reductions. Moreover, some 
facilities might have begun making changes to their operations even before the program was 
13 
 
initiated to reduce negative publicity. They might have joined the program simply to get credit 
for reductions they were going to make anyway. Additionally, non-participants may have 
incentives to reduce releases to avoid future compliance costs. It is also possible that the 
reduction in 33/50 releases was largely due to the mandatory phase out of the OD chemicals and 
not the voluntary 33/50 program. 
The effect of program participation might differ across chemicals. The aggregated 
releases of the two OD chemicals were only about 14% of the total 33/50 releases in 1988 (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1997). But releases of the OD chemicals experienced the 
highest percentage reduction (86%) from 1988 to 1995. During the same period, releases of the 
non OD chemicals decreased by only 40%. Since facilities knew that the OD chemicals were to 
be phased out, even non-participants in the program would have incentives to reduce their 
releases of these chemicals while not having similar incentives to reduce the releases of the non-
OD chemicals. Thus, the effect of the program on releases of these two types of chemicals could 
differ due to differences in other factors motivating facilities to reduce these two types of 
releases. 
The effects of the program might also differ across chemicals with different toxicity. 
Some of the 33/50 chemicals such as lead, mercury and cadmium have high toxicity and 
carcinogenicity and have been identified as priority chemicals for reduction by the U.S. EPA. 
Facilities using highly toxic 33/50 chemicals are more likely to undertake voluntary efforts to 
reduce emissions of these chemicals to avoid future liabilities and to respond to stronger 
pressures from environmental groups (Maxwell, et al., 2000) and local communities (Gamper-
Rabindran, 2006).  
We undertake this analysis by hypothesizing that the ith facility’s emissions at time t, Yit, 
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are determined by a vector of observed exogenous facility-specific variables, itX (such as a 
facility’s production technology, level of output produced, input and output prices), its program 
participation decision, itP , and unobserved facility-specific fixed effects. Emissions are also 
affected by managerial, technical and organizational features of a facility’s operations which 
may change slowly over time and are not always observable. Output, managerial characteristics 
and technology are likely to change slowly and be autoregressive and are unobservable. We 
proxy their effects by including lagged emissions. For those reasons, we expect to see path-
dependence in the 33/50 releases and specify the regression model as follows: 
                          1 1 2 3it it it it i t ity y X P d uρ β θ β β λ−Δ = Δ + Δ + + + + Δ  ,  t=1991,..., 1995             [2-1] 
where yit is 33/50 releases, 1it it ity y y −Δ = − , 1 1 2it it ity y y− − −Δ = − 1it it itX X X −Δ = − , 1it it itu u u −Δ = − 7.  
The binary participation variable is 1isP =  for t s≥ if facility joined the program in year s , 
and 0isP =  otherwise. The variable, tλ  captures the time trend, and id represents time-invariant 
industry dummies and variables that control for location effects. The coefficient θ  for program 
participation can be interpreted as the difference in the rate of release reduction between 
participants and non-participants when ity is taken in log form.  
To correct for the endogeneity of Pit,, we use a two-step procedure8. First, like previous 
studies we obtain the predicted probability of participation by estimating a discrete choice model 
of program participation in the first step (as described by equation [2-2]). Second, we use this as 
an instrument to estimate the impact of participation on change in releases together with earlier 
                                                 
7 It is possible that the error term still contains individual specific effects since we did not first difference all the 
explanatory variables.  
8 This two-step procedure ensures that the standard errors obtained in the second step are asymptotically valid, and it 
is robust to misspecifications of the first step model (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 623).  
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lags of the dependent variable to control for endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable in 
equation [2-1]. 
                               1 2 3 4it it i t it itP x d zδ δ δ λ δ ε= + + + +                                              [2-2] 
where 1itP = is observed iff 2 ' ' 0it it itx zβ δ ε+ + > ; 0itP = otherwise; t=1991,…,1995. To ensure 
identification of the parameters in equation [2-1] it is important to have some variables itz  that 
are hypothesized to influence participation but are uncorrelated with the change of releases. In 
the next section we will describe the choices of these variables in detail. 
Since we have a relatively short panel with lagged dependent variable, we could use 
2SLS by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) to estimate equation [2-1], where 2ity − is used as an 
instrument, since 2( ) 0it itE y u− Δ =  and 2ity − is correlated with ityΔ (Andersen and Hsiao, 1981). 
Additional instruments are available when the panel has more than 3 period observations, which 
means 2 1( ,.... )it iy y− can be used as instruments in the first-differenced equation for period t. 
However, 2SLS is not asymptotically efficient, even if the complete set of instruments is used for 
each equation at each time (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Arellano and Bond recommend using a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation procedure for equation [2-1] that uses two-
year and earlier lags of the dependent variable as GMM instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable with the following instrument matrix:  
1
1 2
1..... , 2
0...... 0 0
0 ..... 0
....... ...... . .
0 0 0
i
i i
i
i i T
y
y y
Z
y y −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, where each row corresponds to the first 
differenced equation for periods t=3,4,..T, for each observation i. To reduce small sample bias , 
we limit the number of GMM instruments to two-year lags of the dependent variable as 
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suggested by Roodman (Roodman, 2006) and others. The resulting instrument matrix has the 
following form: 
2
3
, 2
0...... 0 0
0 0..... 0
. ...... . .
0 0 0
i
i
i
i T
y
y
Z
y −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, where each row corresponds to the first 
differenced equations for period t=1991 , 1992, 1993..1995. Thus, 33/50 releases in 1989 serve 
as an instrument for releases in 1991 and so on. 9 This leads to an instrumental variable matrix 
consisted of a total of six columns, with five columns of 2ity −  as instrument for each period of t 
=(1991..1995) ; and one column of predicted probability obtained from estimating equation [2-2]. 
Since we have two endogenous variables, 1 and it ity P−Δ , the number of over identified 
conditions(restrictions) is thus 6-2=4.  
To avoid concerns that releases during program years could be serially correlated, we 
also estimate alternative models using pre-program releases (1988 and 1989) as instruments 
instead of 2ity −  for releases during the program years. Releases in 1988 and 1989 happened prior 
to the program’s initiation and were uncorrelated with the error terms for the period of 1991 to 
1995. This results in 9 over-identified conditions (two columns instruments for each period of t, 
plus one column of predicted probability, and minus two endogenous variables).  
We use the Hansen’s J statistics to test for orthogonality of the instruments and the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk statistics to detect weak correlation/identification between the instruments 
and the endogenous variables. We also test for second-order auto-correlation of the errors in the 
releases models using tests suggested in (Wooldridge, 2002). Results of these tests are reported 
and discussed in section 2.7. 
 
                                                 
9 Our results remain robust to the number of lags included in this instrumental variable matrix.  
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2.4 Variable Construction  
 2.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in equation [2-1] is constructed by taking the logarithm of 33/50 
releases at the facility level and then taking its first difference. The 33/50 releases include onsite 
releases to air, water, land, and off-site transfers for treatment and disposal of all 33/50 chemicals 
emitted by a facility. In other models we evaluate the program’s effect on releases of OD 
chemicals, non-OD chemicals and on toxicity weighted 33/50 releases. All of those variables are 
also in logarithm and then first differenced. The dependent variable in equation [2-2] takes a 
value of 1 if a facility participated in the program in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
2.4.2. Explanatory Variables 
 Our key explanatory variables included in both equation [2-1] and [2-2] are proxies for 
regulatory pressures faced by facilities, industry, time and location effects. Industry-specific 
effects are controlled by including ten industry dummies, classified by facility’s primary 2-digit 
SIC code. Time effects are controlled by time dummies for 1991-1995. Variables to control for 
location effects include County Median Income of the county in which a TRI facility is located 
(in logarithm). Since these variables do not vary over time, we include them in levels in each of 
the two steps of estimation.  
As proxies for existing and anticipated costs of compliance with regulations at the facility 
level, we include the Number of Inspections for compliance with air pollution regulations and the 
HAP-TRI ratio, defined as the percentage of releases of hazardous air pollutants (HAP 10 ) 
chemicals in total TRI releases. Facilities that were inspected more frequently previously were 
more likely to show good-faith efforts to the regulators by participating in the voluntary program 
                                                 
10 189 toxic chemicals are identified as Hazard Air Pollutant Chemicals and include the 17 33/50 chemicals. 
 
18 
 
and reducing releases (as in, Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Sam, et al., 2009), possibly to reduce the 
frequency of inspections in the future (as found to be the case by (Innes and Sam, 2008)). HAP 
chemicals were expected to be regulated from year 2000 onwards with the imposition of 
Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT) standards. Firms with a higher value of this 
ratio were likely to face greater costs of compliance in the future and thus have greater incentives 
to participate in the 33/50 program and reduce releases ahead of time using flexible methods 
(Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). Both HAP-
TRI ratio and Number of Inspections vary over time and are lagged by one year and then first-
differenced.  
We also include proxies for the stringency of the existing regulatory climate of the county. 
These include the County Non-attainment Status for the 1991-1995 period. As per the 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments, every county in the US is designated annually as being in 
attainment or in non-attainment with national air quality standards for six criteria air pollutants: 
carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, total suspended particulates, ozone, nitrogen oxide and 
particulate matter. Facilities in counties that are in non-attainment are expected to be subjected to 
more stringent controls (Greenstone, 2002), with the degree of stringency varying with the 
severity of pollution (basic, marginal, moderate, serious, two categories of severe and extreme) 
(Tietenberg, 2006). These facilities may be more likely to undertake voluntary efforts to improve 
environmental performance. Khanna et al. (2009) find that firms located in non-attainment 
counties were more likely to voluntarily adopt pollution prevention techniques to reduce toxic 
releases. We aggregate the total number of pollutants for which the county was in non-attainment 
status in a given year, then use its first difference as a proxy for local regulatory stringency.  
The voting record of Senate and House of Representatives on environmental bills may 
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reflect the political climate in the state, which may influence the stringency of future state 
environmental regulations. We include the first difference of the State LCV Scores of 
environmental-friendly bills passed by the state legislature from 1991 to 1995 (League of 
Conservation Voters, 2007). We also include its squared term to allow for non-linear effects.  
2.4.3. Excluded Instruments for Program Participation 
 To ensure identification of the parameters in equation [2-1], we use as instruments those 
variables that were correlated with the facility’s participation decision but not with its change in 
releases during the program period. These variables have also been shown by previous studies 
(as discussed below) to influence firm-level participation and are not likely to be correlated with 
a facility’s releases. These variables are included as explanatory variables in the probit model of 
participation in equation [2-2] but are excluded from equation [2-1]. These variables include a 
dummy for whether the facility belonged to a firm in the first invitation group, change in releases 
of the firm prior to the program (1988 to 1990) and the percentage of a firm’s TRI releases 
emitted by a facility prior to the program (in year 1988 or 1989). We do not include any 
(program year) emissions variables either at the firm or facility level as instruments since those 
could be influenced by similar variables as the facility’s change in releases. We describe these 
instruments in greater detail below. 
Our first instrument is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a facility belongs to 
one of the 517 parent companies that were the first to receive an invitation to join the 33/50 
program in March 1991. Subsequent invitations to eligible firms were sent out by the EPA in 
July 1991, July 1992, Jan 1993 and 1994, to encourage participation in the 33/50 program. Of the 
top “500 firms” in the first invitation group, 64% participated in the program. Earlier studies 
have found that firms belonging to the First Invitation Group were more likely to participate in 
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the 33/50 program (Arora and Cason, 1996; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Khanna and Damon, 
1999; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). We also find that 12.6 % of the facilities belonging to the 
firms in the first invitation group participated in the 33/50 program 11 . The variable First 
Invitation Group can be considered exogenous to the change in releases at the facility level 
except through program participation because the formation of invitation group preceded the 
initiation of the 33/50 program and was based on the ranking of top companies by the 1991 
Fortune Magazine (Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Khanna and Damon, 1999). Moreover, while the 
first invitation group is defined at the parent company level, the dependent variable ityΔ is 
defined at the facility level. Since parent companies typically have multiple facilities not all of 
which participated, the change in 33/50 releases at the facility level is not likely to be directly 
impacted by the invitation to the parent company and it’s decision to enroll in the program 
except through the facility’s participation decision.  
We include the share of a facility’s total TRI releases in the total TRI releases of the 
parent company prior to program participation as an explanatory variable since that might have 
influenced the selection of facility for program participation within the firm. We measure this 
Share in Total TRI Releases of Parent Company in 1988 or in 1989 depending on data 
availability. While a larger share in a parent company’s total TRI releases prior to the program is 
likely to influence participation in the program, it is unlikely to directly influence subsequent 
reductions by a facility in a sub-set of the TRI releases (33/50 chemicals) unless it is through the 
facility’s participation decision.  
                                                 
11 One of the studies (Arora and Cason, 1996) only observe the assignment of the first invitation group for 
participating companies; thus a selection model to predict the likelihood of being in the first invitation group is 
estimated and the predicted value is used in their program participating model. In contrast, we are able to identify 
both participants and non-participants in our dataset for all companies that were in the first invitation group, thus we 
do not need to control for selection in the first invitation group in our study. 
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In addition, earlier studies at the firm level have hypothesized that a firm is more likely to 
participate in the 33/50 program if it had achieved greater reduction in 33/50 releases prior to the 
program (during years 1988 to 1990) (Arora and Cason, 1996; Innes and Sam, 2008; Khanna and 
Damon, 1999; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). The empirical finding on the effect of prior reduction 
in 33/50 releases on program participation is mixed. Arora and Cason (1996), Khanna and 
Damon (1999), Vidovic and Khanna (2007) found that the prior change in 33/50 releases was not 
significant in the program participation model12 while Innes and Sam found that prior reduction 
in 33/50 releases significantly increased the likelihood of program participation. Unlike, Khanna 
and Damon (1999) and Innes and Sam (2008), Vidovic and Khanna (2007) include this variable 
in the second stage outcome equation and find that firms that had undertaken a larger reduction 
prior to the program also reduced more 33/50 releases during the program; the program’s effect 
is found to be insignificant after including the prior change in 33/50 releases in the second-stage 
release model. 13  We estimate specifications that include and exclude this variable as an 
instrument to examine the robustness of our results. We define Firm Prior Change in Releases as 
the change in releases achieved by a firm prior to the program in our program participation 
model (that is, 33/50 releases in 1990 minus the releases in 1988).  
2.5 Data Description 
The TRI contains chemical and facility specific information on toxic releases to different 
environmental media, from which, we calculate the 33/50 releases, the HAP releases and total 
TRI releases per facility. It also provides information on SIC codes, names and Dun and 
Bradstreet (D&B) numbers of parent company and facility locations (U.S. Environmental 
                                                 
12 Two studies defined the prior reduction in 33/50 releases as the percentage reduction relative to the base year 
(Arora and Cason, 1996; Khanna and Damon, 1999). 
13 However, Vidovic and Khanna (2007) define prior change in releases such that it is 0 for years 1992-1995, and 
non-zero for the year 1991, in the second-stage equation. 
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Protection Agency, 2004). We use the TRI data to create an unbalanced panel of facilities 
eligible to participate in the 33/50 program if they emitted 33/50 releases over the period 1988-
1990. This led to 16,352 eligible facilities in 48 U.S states for the period 1988-1995. Of these 
eligible facilities, we identified 11,597 facilities for which parent company information was 
available for the period 1988-1995. Of these, 2,569 facilities had to be dropped from the sample 
as they were no longer reporting to TRI from 1991 onwards. As a result, our econometric 
estimation of equation [2-2] includes 9,028 facilities and 35,827 observations. In estimating 
equation [2-1], we lose some observations due to first differencing and missing lagged variables 
for some of the observations. Although the panel dataset used for equation (1) is un-balanced, the 
average length of period for each facility in the data set is 3.89 years; with only 77% of 
observations remaining in the dataset for at least 3 years. As a result, we are left with 8,756 
facilities and 34,339 observations for estimating equation [2-2]. 
These facilities are identified as belonging to 4,123 parent companies using parent 
company names and D&B numbers reported in TRI, of which 1,203 parent companies 
participated in the 33/50 program.14 We use company names reported in (33/50 Program office, 
1991, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1992) to identify the parent companies that were 
in the first invitation group and use that information to determine the facilities that belonged to 
these firms. The EPA reports that 517 firms were invited first (in March 1991) to participate in 
the program. Of these, 328 firms joined the program. Of the 5,400 firms in the second invitation 
group contacted by the EPA in July 1991, 819 firms joined the program. Subsequently, 140 other 
firms participated in the program (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997). We are able to 
                                                 
14 The EPA listed 1294 parent companies as participants in the 33/50 program in their final report in 1997. We were 
unable to find 91 of these parent company names in the 2004 release of TRI database (since some company names 
may have been updated by the EPA).  
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identify 319 out of the 328 participating companies in the first invitation group; 760 out of 819 
participants in the second invitation group and 124 of the 140 remaining participating companies. 
We obtain the list of 33/50 participating companies and information about the 
participation status of each of their facilities through personal communication with Hampshire 
Research 15 . We found with only 23.6% of the facilities (1335 facilities) belonging to 
participating parent companies participated in the program, instead of 100% (5595 facilities) 
assumed by all previous studies. More specifically, the low participation rate at the facility level 
was driven by the fact that most firms with multiple facilities had only one or a few participating 
facilities. Therefore assuming that all facilities of all 33/50 companies participated in the 
program is incorrect when examining the impact of the program on releases16.  
Facility-specific data on the numbers of violations, penalties and inspections for 
compliance with mandatory air regulations are obtained from EPA’s AIRS Facility Subsystem 
(AFS) database (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007a). These data were merged with 
the TRI data using the unique TRI-identifier for each facility. The reported location of a facility 
in the TRI data-set was used to merge the above data with county’s median income from 1990 
census and county’s attainment status (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007b) and with 
state level scores on environmental legislations (League of Conservation Voters, 2007 ). We use 
                                                 
15 Facility level participation data was obtained from Catherine Miller, Hampshire Research, www.hampshire.org. 
16 The low participation rate at the facility level for the multi-plants companies could indicate that the incentive for 
the companies to enroll another facility was significantly reduced once one facility had enrolled. We thank the 
anonymous reviewer for raising this point. We informally test this idea using a bivariate probit model with a 
facility’s participation decision and the decision to participate by all other facilities as the two discrete choice 
variables. We find that participation by other facilities had a negative statistically significant impact on a facility’s 
participation decision. We do not present these results here for brevity but they are available from the authors on 
request.  
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the Threshold Values Limit17 as toxicity index to calculate the toxicity weighted 33/50 releases, 
as in Maxwell et al. (2000) and Sam et al. (2009). 
Our data show that total 33/50 releases for our sample facilities dropped by 15.7% 
between 1988 and 1991 and by 58.7% between 1988 and 1995 (this is close to the estimates 
reported by the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997)). Sum of releases of OD 
chemicals for our sample declined by 90% while those of non-OD chemicals declined by 53% 
over the 1988-1995 period. The average releases of toxicity weighted 33/50 releases by program 
participants declined by 72% and those by non-participants declined by 40% over this period. 
The average releases of the two OD chemicals by program participants declined by 92% while 
those by non-participants declined by 84% (Figure 2.1). Over the same period, the average 
releases of the 15 non-OD chemicals declined by 41% for participating facilities and by 27% for 
non-participating facilities (Figure 2.2).  
2.6 Determinants of Program Participation 
Summary statistics for the data used in this study are reported in Tables2.1 and 2.2. Table 
2.1 shows that on average participating facilities emit more 33/50 releases, face greater 
frequency of inspections, and are located in counties with non-attainment status for a larger 
number of criteria pollutants and in states with higher LCV scores as compared to non-program 
participants. Table 2.2 shows that about half of our sample comes from chemical, fabricated 
metal and primary metal industries.  
                                                 
17 The TLV of a chemical substance is a level to which it is believed a worker can be exposed day after day for a 
working lifetime without adverse health effects. 
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Parameter estimates obtained from the pooled probit18 models on probability of program 
participation at facility level are shown in Table 2.3. The estimation uses data from 1991-1995 
and includes 9,028 facilities and 35,827 observations. We consider three different specifications 
which include the three instrumental variables in a sequential manner. Model I includes the 
dummy variable equal to one if the parent company was in the first invitation group. Model II 
includes the variables in Model I and the facility’s share in the parent company’s TRI releases as 
an additional explanatory variable. Model III includes the previous two instrumental variables 
and the prior change in releases by the parent company of the facility. The AIC decreases from 
21,732 in Model I to 20,360 Model III suggesting that Model III provides the best fit to the data.  
Although most previous studies have modeled program participation at firm level, our 
participation models at facility level yield similar results as previous studies in the following 
aspects19: first, facilities belonging to a parent company that were the first invitees were more 
likely to participate in the program (Arora and Cason, 1996; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006; Khanna 
and Damon, 1999; Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). Second, facilities belonging to a parent company 
                                                 
18  To test the robustness of our estimate of the probability of participation, we estimated several alternative 
specifications of equation [2-2]. Although participation in the program was voluntary and a facility was free to 
withdraw at any time, in practice, no participating facility withdrew from the program over the 1991-1995 period. 
To account for that, we estimated a model using data that excluded facilities after the first year in which they 
participated as in Khanna and Damon (1999). The results of our analysis for equations [2-1] and [2-2] are 
qualitatively the same as those reported in the paper and are available from the authors on request. Additionally, we 
also estimated a model that considers a facility’s participation decision as being nested within its parent company’s 
participation decision using a bivariate probit model. The two discrete decision variables in this case were a firm’s 
participation decision and the participation decision of a facility within a participating parent firm. The explanatory 
variables used were the same as those included in Table 2. We obtained the predicted probability of participation for 
each facility from this model and used that as an instrument in the two-step approach. These parameter estimates for 
equation [2-1] were found to be similar in magnitude and direction as those reported in Table 2.3 and are available 
on request from the authors. 
 
19 Previous studies at firm level also have found that close proximity to consumers is one of the significant 
determinants in program participation. This effect is usually approximated by a dummy variable indicating a firm is 
producing final product sold to consumers (Khanna and Damon, 1999; Sam, et al., 2009). We do not find it to be a 
significant factor in our analysis across all specifications, possibly because facilities have less direct contact with 
consumers than their parent companies. Thus, we do not report the results including final product variable. 
  
26 
 
that had achieved greater reductions in 33/50 releases between 1988 and 1990 were more likely 
to participate (Innes and Sam, 2008). Third, facilities that were inspected more frequently for 
compliance with clean air regulations were also more likely to participate in the 33/50 program 
(Innes and Sam, 2008; Sam, et al., 2009)20. Like Gamper-Rabindran (2006), we find that the 
HAP-TRI ratio for a facility is not a statistically significant determinant of program participation 
in all three specifications21. Previous studies have found mixed evidence on the effect of county 
characteristics (percentage of poverty, and minority population in the county) on program 
participation (Gamper-Rabindran, 2006). Our results show that facilities located in non-
attainment counties and in counties with higher median household income were more likely to 
participate in the program. Facilities located in a state with better scores on environmental bills 
were more likely to participate in the program. Additionally, by analyzing facility participation 
we find that facilities accounting for a larger share of parent company TRI emissions were more 
likely to participate. We use the predicted probability from Model III as an instrument in the 
following estimations reported in Table 2.3 to Table 2.7.  
2.7 Impact of 33/50 Program on Releases 
We report the feasible efficient GMM estimates that are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustering, the number of over identified conditions, the associated P values for the Hansen’s J 
test statistics of over identification and the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistics for weak identification 
(Baum, et al., 2003) in Table 2.4-2.7.  
                                                 
20 In contrast to previous studies at firm level, we do not include lagged 33/50 releases, TRI releases or 33/50-TRI 
ratio at the facility level in our program participation model because of possible serial correlation among the 
unobservable factors influencing participation and toxic release levels. 
 
21 They find an exception to this in the case of the chemical industry. 
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The test statistics on over identification22 are not statistically significant at the 5% level in 
all models except Column XII and Column XVI, indicating the validity of our instruments. The 
reason for the significant test statistic for over-identification in Column XII and Column XVI of 
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 is mostly likely due to the small sample resulting from the fact that the 
releases of OD chemicals were almost completely phased out in the later period of the program, 
and the sample of facilities reporting OD chemicals declined significantly over time23. We also 
test for auto-correlation of the errors of the models estimated in Tables 2.4 to 2.7. As expected, 
first-order autocorrelation does exist due to first-differencing of equation [2-1]. However, 
second-order autocorrelation is rejected for all models, using tests suggested in (Wooldridge, 
2002) p.282-283).  
2.7.1. Main Results  
Our results are as follows. We find that program participants reduced 33/50 releases 
statistically significantly more than non-participants. All models in Table 2.4 show that the 
program’s effect on the change of 33/50 releases is negative and significant (Table 2.4, row 2). 
Model IV includes the prior change in 33/50 releases as an explanatory variable and uses 2ity −  as 
instrument. Model V has the same explanatory variables as Model IV but uses 33/50 releases in 
1988 and 1989 as instruments24.  Model VI has the same instruments as Model IV but excludes 
the prior change in 33/50 releases as an explanatory variable. Model VII includes the same 
explanatory variables as Model VI but uses 33/50 releases in 1988 and 1989 as instruments. 
                                                 
22 The validity of the entire set of instruments can be tested by Hansen’s J statistic that measures the value of GMM 
criterion function at the efficient GMM estimator under the null. It follows a chi-squared distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of over identifying restrictions under the null (Baum, et al., 2007). 
23 The test has lower power in small sample cases and rejects orthogonality too often in small samples (Hansen, et 
al., 1996, Hayashi, 2000). 
24 We estimated the models in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 using the corresponding 1988 and 1989 33/50 releases as 
instruments. Because those results differ little from results currently reported in Table 4 and 5 we do not include 
them in the tables. They are available upon request.  
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Across the four specifications, the coefficient of the 33/50 participation variable ranges 
from -0.237 to -0.188. Since the 33/50 releases are included in logarithm form, the coefficient on 
program participation measures the difference in the rate of reduction between participants and 
non-participants. In other words, the rate of reduction of 33/50 releases for participants was 
18.8% to 23.7% higher than for non-participants.  
Contrary to the conclusion of Vidovic and Khanna (2007), we find the program’s effect 
to be negative and statistically significant even after including the prior change of 33/50 releases 
as an explanatory variable in the second step estimation (Model IV and V). Furthermore, across 
the four columns in Table 2.4, we find that facilities with a higher HAP-TRI ratio in the previous 
period achieved greater reduction in 33/50 releases (Table 2.4, row 4). Facilities that are located 
in counties with higher median income experienced greater reduction of 33/50 releases. Since 
both releases and county median income are measured in logarithm, we conclude that a 1 percent 
increase in county median income resulted in 0.07% to 0.08% increase in the rate of reduction 
(Table 2.4, row 9), 
2.7.2. Alternative Specifications  
Our main specifications in Table 2.4 include the lagged dependent variable and the 
results indicate that the lagged change in 33/50 releases is strongly correlated with the current 
change in releases and that change in 33/50 releases is a continuous process. The positive 
coefficients on the time dummies indicates that there was also a discrete downward trend in 
33/50 releases even in the absence of the program, though the rate of reduction diminished over 
time. To check that our results are robust to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, we 
also estimated the specification (Model VIII) in Table 2.5 without this variable. We find that 
program participation continues to have a statistically significant negative impact on 33/50 
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releases although the coefficient for program participation becoming much larger than in 
previous specifications. The statistical significance of the lagged dependent variable in earlier 
models indicates path dependency in emissions. This suggests the potential for omitted variable 
bias in this specification and that greater reliance should be placed on the program effect 
obtained from those specifications.  
Furthermore, it is possible that the effect of the 33/50 program was not continuous over 
the duration of the program; instead program participants could have adopted abatement methods 
that led to discrete reductions in their 33/50 releases25. If this was the case, the effect of the 
program might differ over the course of the program, with abatement in initial years raising the 
marginal abatement cost and reducing incentives to reduce emissions in later years of the 
program. The results with the inclusion of a time-specific participation variable are presented in 
Model IX in Table 2.5. We create these time-specific participation variables (participation 1991 
to participation 1997) for each year of the program as in Innes and Sam (2008)26. The coefficient 
                                                 
25 We thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  
26 We first create new dummy variables as 1itD = , if facility i participated in the program in year t, and zero 
otherwise. We then constructed new program participation variables for each year (part1991, part1995), such  
that
1995
s it
t s
Part D
=
= ∑ , for 1991,1992,...1995s = .For example, for a facility that participated from 1991 onwards, 
this results in a vector of  new participation variables such as 
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
' 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
part
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
We obtain the predicted probability Pˆ from the first stage participation model and create the  vector of instrumental 
variables 'IV for the new participation variables such as 
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of each of these time specific participation variable represents the incremental effect of 
participation on 33/50 releases that year. For example, the coefficient of participation1992 
measures the effect of the 33/50 program on change in releases from 1992 onwards. Lastly, we 
also examine if the program had an effect on emissions after it ended in 1995. In Model X we 
include time specific participation dummies for 1996 and 1997 in addition to previous year.  
We find that the effect of the program on 33/50 releases remains robust to these 
alternative specifications and that the program still had a significant and negative impact on the 
change of 33/50 releases. However, we now observe that the program’s effect was most evident 
in 1992 (Table 2.5, Row 3). This is consistent with Innes and Sam (2008) who also measure the 
program’s effect from 1992 to 1995 and find it to be negative and statistically significant only in 
1992. Contrary to Sam et al. (2009) that find a significant and negative impact of the 33/50 
program for the period of 1996-1998, we find that the program did not have additional 
significant impacts after the program ended.  
2.7.3. Toxicity –weighted Releases and Regulation on OD Chemicals  
We now examine the program’s effect on toxicity-weighted 33/50 releases, on OD 
chemicals and the rest of 33/50 chemicals. Model XI in Table 2.6 (using 2ity − as instrument) 
shows that the program had a statistically significant negative impact on the toxicity weighted 
sum of 33/50 releases. The rate of reduction for program participants is 32.2% higher than for 
non-participants, even after we control for the effect of prior reduction in 33/50 releases. These 
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The analysis for period 1991-1997 follows the same strategy with program participants in 1995 represented as 
participants in years 1996 and 1997  
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results indicate that program participants reduced both the total amount of 33/50 releases and 
toxicity weighted 33/50 releases. We do not find county median income to have a significant 
effect on the change in toxicity weighted 33/50 releases (Table 2.6, Row9). Gamper-Rabindran 
(2006) also finds that these environmental justice indicators such as education level and poverty 
did not have a statistically significant effect on toxicity-weighted releases; instead facilities in 
counties with higher voter’s participation ratio experienced greater reduction in toxicity-
weighted releases.  
Additionally, we find that the program’s effect varied by groups of chemicals. Model XII 
(Table 2.6) examines the program’s impact of OD chemicals and shows that the effect of the 
program on OD chemicals was not statistically significant. This suggests that since OD 
chemicals were supposed to be phased out by 1996, all facilities had incentives to reduce their 
dependence on those two chemicals and that these reductions were not induced by the 33/50 
program. In contrast, the program’s effect on non-OD releases is negative and statistically 
significant as reported in Model XIII, Table 2.6. The annual rate of reduction of non-OD 33/50 
releases is 20.8% higher for participants than non-participants. The overall reduction in 33/50 
releases was, therefore, not solely due to the mandatory phase-out of OD chemicals.  
Since the Montreal Protocol was first signed in 1987, facilities might have taken 
measures to reduce their OD chemicals even in the absence of the voluntary 33/50 program. To 
further investigate the relative effectiveness of the voluntary 33/50 program vs. the mandatory 
regulations for OD chemicals, we include the percentage of OD releases in total 33/50 releases 
before the program started as an explanatory variable (Table 2.6, Model XIV). Firms with a 
larger value of this variable are more likely to have felt the stringency of the Montreal Protocol 
and could have made greater efforts to reduce OD releases and thus their 33/50 releases. We find 
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this variable does have a negative and statistically significant effect on 33/50 releases but the 
sign and even the magnitude of the effect of the 33/50 program are unchanged. The reduction in 
33/50 releases appears to have been largely due to the voluntary 33/50 program instead of the 
OD regulation whose effect on 33/50 releases was rather small. Specifically, we find that a 10 
percent increase in OD-33/50 ratio led to 0.02% greater rate of reduction in 33/50 releases (Row 
3, Model XIV).  
2.7.4. Effect of Assuming Participation by All Facilities of 33/50 Parent Companies 
In Table 2.7, we compare our results using facility level participation data with those we 
would have obtained if we had incorrectly attributed participation status to all facilities 
belonging to a firm from which even one facility had participated. Models XV, XVI and XVII 
use with the same instrument set as in Model IV but are estimated assuming that all facilities in a 
firm participated even if only one facility had participated. We find that, in this case, the 
program’s effect on overall 33/50 releases is attenuated to - 5.1% in Model XV for all 33/50 
chemicals and -6.6% in Model XVII for non-OD chemicals. 
Finally, our estimates show that the impact of program participation on the expected 
levels of 33/50 releases is greater than the estimates by Khanna and Damon (1999) and the 
estimates by Innes and Sam (2008). Since our estimated coefficient θ) on program participation 
represents the effect of the program on the rate of reduction in releases, we derive the program’s 
impact on the levels of releases, in order to compare our estimates with those of previous studies. 
We also include the dynamic effect of program-induced previous reductions in 33/50 releases on 
current releases. Estimates obtained using the coefficients of two specific Models (XIV and IX) 
are shown in Table 2.8. Estimates derived from using the coefficients of other models estimated 
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in Table 3 yield very similar results. Our findings for the 1991-1995 period for all participating 
facilities imply that the percentage decrease due to program was about 44% to 56% compared to 
the average 33/50 releases of the participants in 1990 (Row 6, Table 2.8). Compared to the 
sample average 33/50 releases in 1990, Khanna and Damon (1999) estimate that the percentage 
decrease due to program was about 27.92 % over the period 1991 -1993 for the chemical 
industry. Focusing only on the average 33/50 releases of the participants, Innes and Sam (2008) 
estimated the reduction in 33/50 releases (relative to the 1990 level) that could be attributed to 
the program to be more than 45%, over the period of 1992-1995. In addition, Innes and Sam 
(2008) find that 70%-85% of the total reduction occurred in the first year of the program, 1992. 
We find that the reduction in 1992 was the largest compared to the rest of the years but it 
accounted for 36% of the total reduction27 
2.8 Conclusions 
This study reassesses the effectiveness of the 33/50 program using facility level 
participation and emissions data for all eligible facilities reporting to TRI for the 1988-1995 
period. It examines the extent to which the program induced reductions in releases over and 
above those that would have been achieved otherwise, or simply due to regulations to phase out 
the OD chemicals and whether the program impact differed across chemical types. We use 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM approach with valid instrumental variables which enables us 
to control for endogeneity associated with program participation and dynamics of emissions 
production. This method is applied using the largest possible sample of over 8,000 facilities 
eligible for participation in the 33/50 program for which data was available. 
                                                 
27 Innes and Sam (2008) assume that all participants participated in 1992 due to data availability. We include 
additional time-specific participation information in our estimates. Our data show that that 40% of the participants 
enrolled in the program after 1992 instead of 100% assumed by Innes and Sam (2008). This could explain the 
difference between our results and Innes and Sam (2008).  
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Our results show that 33/50 facilities significantly reduced their overall 33/50 releases. 
Across various specifications, the rate of reduction in 33/50 releases for program participants is 
14.8% to 23.7% higher than non-participants, after controlling for industry effects, time trend 
and other regulatory pressures. The program had a statistically significant impact on releases of 
the 15 non-OD chemicals but not on the OD chemicals. Reductions in releases of OD chemicals 
appear to have been motivated primarily by the Montreal Protocol. However, the overall impact 
of the Montreal Protocol on 33/50 releases was relatively small compared to the effect of the 
33/50 program, indicating the importance of voluntary programs in expanding the reach of 
existing mandatory regulations.  
Furthermore, we find that the program’s incremental effect was statistically significant at 
the beginning of the program and did not continue beyond the duration of the program. The 
assessment of program outcomes obtained by using facility-specific participation information 
differs considerably from that obtained by incorrectly assuming that all facilities of a parent 
company participated in the program if even one facility participated. 
In conclusion, this paper provides a more accurate assessment on the effectives of 33/50 
program by using facility level participation information as compared to previous studies. It 
shows the importance of having accurate data and of undertaking analysis at a disaggregated 
scale since program participation impacts differ across facilities within a parent company and 
across the program chemicals that were affected differentially by regulatory pressures. This 
paper examined the average effect of the 33/50 program across all industries. The effects of 
participation could differ across industries for various reasons, including differences in the 
technological possibilities for abatement, costs of abatement, the stringency of the regulatory 
threats faced by the industry and changes in demand conditions. Previous studies by Gamper-
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Rabindran (2006) and Vidovic and Khanna(2007) provide mixed evidence of this. Further 
research using facility specific participation information is needed to examine the extent to 
which the program led to differential effects across industries and to explain its causes.  
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2.9 Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics, 1991-1995. 
  
All 
Facilities 
33/50 
facilities 
Non-33/50 
facilities  
Facility level variables Mean Mean Mean 
33/50 releases (1000 pounds) 84.20 110.68 80.41 
 (296.57) (370.43) (284.25) 
OD releases(1000 pounds) 8.18 12.04 7.63 
 (44.02) (58.51) (41.50) 
Non-OD releases(1000 pounds) 76.02 98.63 72.78 
 (291.18) (366.36) (278.62) 
HAP/TRI ratio(Percentage) 75.79 75.26 75.87 
 (31.41) (31.24) (31.43) 
Number of inspections (AFS) 0.42 0.48 0.41 
 (1.16) (1.25) (1.14) 
Control variables     
County non-attainment status 0.99 1.17 0.97 
 (1.15) (1.16) (1.15) 
LCV score 97.19 101.63 96.56 
 (39.10) (36.87) (39.37) 
Number of facilities 8756 1085 7671 
Total observations 34339 4299 30040 
       Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 2.2 Sample Distribution by Industry, 1991-1995. 
Industry  
Percentage  
in sample 
Percentage  
of 33/50 facilities  
SIC 26: Paper  3.40 3.65 
SIC 28: Chemical 18.24 22.66 
SIC 29: Petroleum 2.59 2.14 
SIC 30: Rubber 7.41 5.21 
SIC 33: Primary metal 10.73 12.63 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal 14.86 15.75 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer 7.26 3.47 
SIC 36:Electronics 7.94 7.89 
SIC 37:Transportation 9.28 10.70 
SIC 38: Instruments 2.07 1.28 
Other Manufacture industries 16.23 14.63 
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Table 2.3 Determinants of Program Participation at Facility Level , 1991-1995. 
Variables 
I 
Program 
participation 
II 
Program 
participation 
III 
Program 
participation 
First Invitation Group 0.245*** 0.567*** 0.473*** 
 [0.037] [0.046] [0.051] 
Share in total TRI releases  
of parent company  0.814*** 0.891*** 
  [0.052] [0.054] 
Firm prior change in releases   -0.121*** 
   [0.019] 
HAP-TRI ratio 0 0 0 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of inspections 0.030** 0.023* 0.016 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
SIC 26: Paper  0.092 0.133 0.143 
 [0.107] [0.108] [0.110] 
SIC 28: Chemical 0.185*** 0.247*** 0.238*** 
 [0.063] [0.063] [0.065] 
SIC 29: Petroleum -0.123 -0.063 -0.076 
 [0.132] [0.136] [0.138] 
SIC 30: Rubber -0.191** -0.154* -0.123 
 [0.084] [0.084] [0.085] 
SIC 33: Primary metal 0.169** 0.208*** 0.228*** 
 [0.073] [0.076] [0.076] 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal 0.069 0.09 0.089 
 [0.064] [0.065] [0.066] 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer -0.378*** -0.307*** -0.332*** 
 [0.095] [0.097] [0.097] 
SIC 36:Electronics 0.033 0.089 0.06 
 [0.078] [0.079] [0.080] 
SIC 37:Transportation 0.147** 0.251*** 0.128* 
 [0.073] [0.075] [0.075] 
SIC 38: Instruments -0.290** -0.265* -0.309** 
 [0.146] [0.149] [0.154] 
County non-attainment status 0.034** 0.031* 0.033* 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] 
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Table 2.3 (Cont.)    
Variables 
I 
Program 
participation 
II 
Program 
participation 
III 
Program 
participation 
State LCV scores 0.869*** 0.926*** 0.846*** 
 [0.195] [0.199] [0.201] 
State LCV scores squared -0.411*** -0.447*** -0.414*** 
 [0.095] [0.097] [0.098] 
Year 1992 0.428*** 0.429*** 0.441*** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] 
Year 1993 0.496*** 0.502*** 0.519*** 
 [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] 
Year 1994 0.542*** 0.549*** 0.566*** 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] 
Year 1995 0.585*** 0.591*** 0.602*** 
 [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] 
County median income 0.293*** 0.278*** 0.268*** 
 [0.092] [0.094] [0.095] 
Constant -5.307*** -5.659*** -5.603*** 
 [0.936] [0.962] [0.970] 
Observations 35827 35827 35827 
AIC 21732.57 20717.67 20360.07 
Correctly Classified 90.36% 90.37% 90.24% 
    
Note: We use pooled probit models to estimate Model I to Model III. Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered 
by facility). The predicted probabilities in Model III are used in all the following estimates. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.4 Program's Effect on 33/50 Releases, 1991-1995. 
 Variables 
 IV 
33/50 releases
 V 
33/50 releases
 VI 
33/50 releases 
 V II 
33/50 releases
Lagged releases 0.484*** 0.515*** 0.486*** 0.518*** 
 [0.029] [0.052] [0.029] [0.052] 
Program participation -0.225** -0.237** -0.188** -0.195** 
 [0.092] [0.094] [0.081] [0.083] 
Firm prior change in releases -0.004 -0.005   
 [0.005] [0.005]   
HAP-TRI ratio -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of inspections -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
State LCV scores 0.294* 0.350** 0.292* 0.348** 
 [0.177] [0.174] [0.177] [0.174] 
State LCV scores squared -0.118 -0.142* -0.117 -0.141* 
 [0.086] [0.085] [0.086] [0.085] 
County non-attainment status 0.035 0.03 0.035 0.03 
 [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] 
County median income -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.084*** -0.077*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] 
Year 1991 0.604** 0.543* 0.622** 0.559** 
 [0.277] [0.278] [0.277] [0.277] 
Year 1992 0.778*** 0.708** 0.794*** 0.722*** 
 [0.276] [0.278] [0.275] [0.277] 
Year 1993 0.676** 0.615** 0.691** 0.628** 
 [0.276] [0.278] [0.275] [0.278] 
Year 1994 0.793*** 0.732*** 0.807*** 0.745*** 
 [0.275] [0.277] [0.275] [0.277] 
Year 1995 0.708** 0.649** 0.723*** 0.661** 
 [0.276] [0.278] [0.275] [0.278] 
SIC 26: Paper  0.033 0.034 0.033 0.034 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] 
SIC 28: Chemical 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] 
SIC 29: Petroleum 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.041 
 [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] 
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 Table 2.4 (Cont.)     
Variables  
 IV 
33/50 releases
 V 
33/50 releases
 VI 
33/50 releases 
 V II 
33/50 releases
SIC 30: Rubber 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.011 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
SIC 33: Primary metal 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.016 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal -0.003 0 -0.003 0 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer -0.078** -0.077** -0.075** -0.074** 
 [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] 
SIC 36:Electronics -0.116*** -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.108*** 
 [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] 
SIC 37:Transportation -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] 
SIC 38: Instruments -0.104** -0.106** -0.101** -0.102** 
 [0.049] [0.049] [0.048] [0.048] 
Observations 34339 34339 34339 34339 
R-squared -0.349 -0.386 -0.35 -0.39 
Number of over identified conditions 4 9 4 9 
Over identification test(P-value) 0.0917* 0.159 0.0914* 0.151 
Weak Identification test 61.48*** 34.73*** 81.39*** 35.28*** 
Number of facilities 8756 8756 8756 8756 
 
Note: Model IV uses yit-2 and the predicted probability of Model III as instruments. Model V uses facility’s releases 
in 1988 and 1989 as instruments in addition to the predicted probability. Model VI uses the same instruments as 
Model IV but excludes the firm’s prior change in 33/50 releases as an explanatory variable. Model VII uses the 
same instruments as Model V but excludes the firm’s prior change in 33/50 releases as an explanatory variable. 
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered by facility). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5. Alternative Specifications Evaluating the Program's Effect, 1991-1997. 
 Variables  
 VIII 
33/50 releases 
 IX 
33/50 releases 
 X 
33/50 releases 
Lagged 33/50 releases  0.492*** 0.517*** 
  (0.028) (0.025) 
Program participation(1991-1995) -0.318***   
 (0.091)   
Participation 1991  -0.04 0.001 
  (0.040) (0.033) 
Participation 1992  -0.148** -0.158*** 
  (0.064) (0.058) 
Participation 1993  0.105 0.112 
  (0.097) (0.089) 
Participation 1994  -0.002 -0.008 
  (0.103) (0.100) 
Participation 1995  -0.053 -0.076 
  (0.107) (0.108) 
Participation 1996   0.21 
   (0.150) 
Participation 1997   -0.079 
   (0.144) 
HAP-TRI ratio -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of inspections -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) 
State LCV scores 0.332** 0.292 0.281* 
 (0.149) (0.178) (0.166) 
State LCV scores squared -0.145** -0.117 -0.114 
 (0.073) (0.087) (0.081) 
County non-attainment status 0.03 0.034 0.006 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.028) 
County median income -0.135*** -0.089*** -0.058*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.021) 
Year 1991 1.108*** 0.670** 0.356 
 (0.302) (0.274) (0.221) 
Year 1992 1.258*** 0.849*** 0.515** 
 (0.301) (0.273) (0.219) 
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 Table 2.5 (Cont.)    
Variables  
 VIII 
33/50 releases 
 IX 
33/50 releases 
 X 
33/50 releases 
Year 1993 1.199*** 0.730*** 0.408* 
 (0.301 (0.274) (0.218) 
Year 1994 1.292*** 0.846*** 0.522** 
 (0.3) (0.273) (0.218) 
Year 1995 1.186*** 0.768*** 0.457** 
 (0.301) (0.274) (0.219) 
Year 1996   0.457** 
   (0.219) 
Year 1997   0.509** 
   (0.219) 
Industry effects  Included Included Included 
Observations 34339 34339 44922 
Number of over identified conditions 0 4 6 
Over identification test(P-value) -- 0.09* 0.05* 
Weak Identification test 265*** 86.17*** 73*** 
Number of facilities 8756 8756 8834 
Note: All models estimated include the ten industry dummy variables. Model VIII uses the same instruments for 
participation as Model VI but excludes the lagged dependent variable. Model IX and Model X uses the same 
instruments for the lagged dependent variables as Model VI . However, the instruments for time-specific 
participation variables are created in the following way. We first create new dummy variables as 1itD = , if facility 
i participated in the program in year t, and zero otherwise. We then constructed new program participation variables 
for each year (part1991, part1995), such that
1995
s it
t s
Part D
=
= ∑ , for 1991,1992,...1995s = .For example, for a 
facility that participated from 1991 onwards, this results in a vector of new participation variables such as 
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
' 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
part
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 . We obtain the predicted probability Pˆ from the first stage participation model and 
create the vector of instrumental variables 'IV for the new participation variables such as 
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
' 0 0
0
P
P P
IV P P P
P P P P
P P P P P
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
)
) )
) ) )
) ) ) )
) ) ) ) )
 
The analysis for period 1991-1997 follows the same strategy with program participants in 1995 represented as 
participants in years 1996 and 1997 . Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.6. Program's Effect on Toxicity Weighted 33/50 Releases and Two Groups of 
Chemicals, 1991-1995. 
 Variables  
  
XI  
Toxicity-weighted
XII 
OD releases
XIII 
Other 15 
Chemicals 
XIV  
33/50 releases 
Lagged releases 0.657*** 0.890*** 0.408*** 0.469*** 
 (0.032) (0.018) (0.034) (0.029) 
Program participation -0.322** -0.039 -0.208** -0.203** 
 (0.138) (0.107) (0.106) (0.092) 
OD-33/50 ratio in 1988    -0.002*** 
    (0.000) 
HAP-TRI ratio -0.015*** 0 0.002 -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) 
Firm prior change in releases 0.003 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
Number of inspections -0.011 -0.003 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.012) (0.011) 
State LCV scores 0.409 -0.029 0.165 0.284 
 (0.302) (0.258) (0.197) (0.176) 
State LCV scores squared -0.175 -0.015 -0.083 -0.112 
 (0.146) (0.126) (0.097) (0.086) 
County non-attainment status 0.067 0.065 0.045 0.041 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.039) (0.030) 
County median income -0.057 -0.031 -0.061* -0.058** 
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) 
Year 1991 0.325 0.15 0.372 0.383 
 (0.416) (0.305) (0.321) (0.276) 
Year 1992 0.521 0.269 0.557* 0.552** 
 (0.414) (0.303) (0.321) (0.275) 
Year 1993 0.364 0.196 0.703** 0.446 
 (0.414) (0.301) (0.320) (0.275) 
Year 1994 0.586 0.349 0.611* 0.559** 
 (0.413) (0.301) (0.320) (0.275) 
Year 1995 0.53 0.388 0.457 0.472* 
 (0.413) (0.302) (0.321) (0.275) 
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Table 2.6 (Cont.)     
 Variables  
  
XI  
Toxicity-weighted
XII 
OD releases
XIII 
Other 15 
Chemicals 
XIV  
33/50 releases 
SIC 26: Paper  0.044 0.022 -0.006 0.022 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.033) (0.027) 
SIC 28: Chemical 0.046* 0.015 0.004 0.055*** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
SIC 29: Petroleum 0.021 -0.119*** -0.003 0.029 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.032) (0.030) 
SIC 30: Rubber -0.038 -0.122*** 0.006 0.029 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.024) 
SIC 33: Primary metal -0.081** -0.024 0.044 0.025 
 (0.037) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal -0.095*** -0.111*** 0.059** 0.008 
 (0.035) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer -0.181*** -0.059 -0.035 -0.048 
 (0.048) (0.037) (0.037) (0.030) 
SIC 36:Electronics -0.193*** -0.099*** -0.082** -0.088*** 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027) 
SIC 37:Transportation -0.075** -0.157*** -0.019 0.023 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.030) (0.024) 
SIC 38: Instruments -0.237*** -0.267*** 0.080* -0.05 
 (0.084) (0.069) (0.048) (0.048) 
Observations 34,339 34,339 34,339 34,339 
Number of over identified conditions 4 4 4 4 
Over identification test(P-value) 0.06* 0*** 0.3 0.09* 
Weak Identification test 80.56*** 47.69*** 78.71*** 63.51*** 
Number of facilities 8756 8756 8756 8756 
Note: All models estimated use yit-2 as instruments for the lagged dependent variables and the predicted probability 
of Model III as instrument for the participation variable.  Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by 
facility). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.7 Evaluation of the Program's Effect Assuming All Facilities of 33/50 Parent 
Companies Had Participated in the Program, 1991-1995. 
Variables  
 XV 
33/50 releases 
 XVI 
OD releases 
 XVII 
Other 15 Chemicals 
Lagged releases 0.493*** 0.960*** 0.415*** 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.033) 
Program participation -0.051** -0.03 -0.066** 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.030) 
HAP-TRI ratio -0.004 -0.004 0 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Firm prior change in releases -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of inspections -0.007 -0.009 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.030) (0.012) 
State LCV scores 0.286 -0.001 0.159 
 (0.178) (0.003) (0.198) 
State LCV scores squared -0.114 0 -0.08 
 (0.087) (0.000) (0.097) 
County non-attainment status 0.035 0.07 0.045 
 (0.031) (0.051) (0.039) 
County median income -0.092*** -0.015 -0.069** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) 
Year 1991 0.706** -0.004 0.461 
 (0.274) (0.309) (0.318) 
Year 1992 0.876*** 0.121 0.645** 
 (0.273) (0.308) (0.318) 
Year 1993 0.773*** -0.165 0.791** 
 (0.273) (0.306) (0.318) 
Year 1994 0.890*** 0.153 0.698** 
 (0.273) (0.308) (0.318) 
Year 1995 0.805*** 0.486 0.545* 
 (0.273) (0.306) (0.319) 
SIC 26: Paper  0.038 0.043 0.003 
 (0.027) (0.041) (0.033) 
SIC 28: Chemical 0.063*** 0.027 0.01 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) 
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Table 2.7 (Cont.)    
Variables  
 XV 
33/50 releases 
 XVI 
OD releases 
 XVII 
Other 15 Chemicals 
SIC 29: Petroleum 0.051* -0.099* 0.011 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.032) 
SIC 30: Rubber 0.019 -0.081** 0.01 
 (0.024) (0.038) (0.033) 
SIC 33: Primary metal 0.011 0.001 0.039 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal -0.004 -0.102*** 0.058** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.026) 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer -0.063** -0.025 -0.021 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.036) 
SIC 36:Electronics -0.111*** -0.069* -0.076** 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.034) 
SIC 37:Transportation -0.008 -0.097** -0.017 
 (0.024) (0.038) (0.030) 
SIC 38: Instruments -0.091* -0.206*** 0.091* 
 (0.048) (0.072) (0.047) 
Observations 34,339 34339 34,339 
Number of over identified conditions 4 4 4 
Over identification test(P-value) 0.0901* 0*** 0.249 
Weak Identification test 140.8 324.1 110.3 
Number of facilities 8756 8756 8756 
 
Note: To estimate Model XV to XVII, we assume all facilities belonging to 33/50 parent companies participated in 
the program. With this assumption, we use Model III to predict a new set of participation probabilities. We use those 
and yit-2 as instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by facility). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8. Impact of Program Participation on the Average 33/50 Releases.  
 
 
 Based on Model XIV-Table 
5 Based on Model IX-Table 4 
 
Year  
Average 
decrease 
in 33/50 
releases 
due to 
program**
(thousand 
pounds) 
(A) 
Percentage 
reduction 
due to 
program 
 
 
 
 
(A)/(B) 
Average decrease 
in 33/50 releases 
due to program** 
(thousand pounds) 
(C) 
Percentage reduction
due to program  
(C)/(B) 
1991 -21.27 -14% -1.05 -1% 
1992 -26.65 -17% -24.51 -16% 
1993 -16.91 -11% -17.31 -11% 
1994 -12.27 -8% -13.58 -9% 
1995 -9.58 -6% -11.35 -7% 
1991-1995 total  -86.68 -56% -66.74 -44% 
Participants’  
average 33/50 releases  
in 1990(thousand pounds) 
(B) 
155.4  
  
 
**Note: The coefficient θ)  on program participation can be approximately viewed as 
1
1
( )it it
it
it
y y
y
P
θ
−
−
−∂
= ∂
)
 
where , 1it ity y − denote the levels of releases. Since this coefficient represents the additional percentage change in 
releases due to program participation, we can derive the reduction due to program participation for the participants. 
We set the initial level of 33/50 releases at the level in 1990; the direct impact due to participation in year t is 
* ityθ
) % and the indirect impact of the program through a reduction in last year’s releases is ( 1991)* tθ ρ −) , holding 
other variables constant. Over time the indirect impact diminishes. We derive the impact due to participation ,t iyΔ%  
for facility i  for each year iteratively using the following equations. We take the expectation on those predicted 
reductions from the samples to get the average decrease due to program per year.  
1991, 1990,
( 1991)
1992, 1991, 1991, 1990, 1991,
( 1991)
1993, 1992, 1992, 1990, 1991, 1992,
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1994, 1993, 1993, 19
( )
( ),
( ),
( ),
i i
t
i i i i i
t
i i i i i i
t
i i i
y y
y y y y y
y y y y y y
y y y y
θ
θ θρ
θ θρ
θ θρ
−
−
−
Δ =
Δ = + = + Δ
Δ = + = + Δ + Δ
Δ = + =
)%
) )% % % %
) )% % % % %
) )% % % 90, 1991, 1992, 1993,
( 1991)
1995, 1994, 1994, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995,( ),
i i i i
t
i i i i i i i i i
y y y
y y y y y y y y yθ θρ −
+ Δ + Δ + Δ
Δ = + = + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ
% % %
) )% % % % % % % %
 
49 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Average OD Releases, 1988-1995. 
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Figure 2.2 Average Releases for non-OD Chemicals, 1988-1995. 
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Chapter 3 Adoption of Pollution Prevention: The Role of 
Information Spillover, Mandatory Regulation, and Voluntary 
Program Participation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Interest in promoting Pollution Prevention (P2) has been increasing since 1991. The 
passage of the Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) by the Congress in 1990 highlighted the 
recognition by policy makers that P2 has the potential to increase resource use efficiency, reduce 
pollution at source, prevent shifting of pollution from one medium to another, and reduce trace 
pollutants otherwise difficult to control (Khanna, 2006). As part of the PPA, facilities that are 
subject to the Toxics Releases Inventory (TRI) are required to disclose the number of 
incremental P2 activities for each listed chemicals from 1991 onward. Though the disclosure is 
required by the PPA, the adoption of P2 remains a voluntary initiative by firms.   
Unlike end-of pipe technologies that are were likely to be available off the shelf, P2 
technologies included modification of the production process and substitution of toxic materials 
with non-toxic or less toxic substances. These activities were more likely to be facility- and 
operation- specific and involved considerable information costs and uncertainty. Due to these 
operational challenges, the U.S. EPA established a P2 information clearinghouse to facilitate 
exchange of information (U.S.Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). Firms might learn about 
P2 technologies from neighbors through informal social interactions and sharing common 
resources (Besley and Case, 1993; Case, 1992; Griliches, 1957). Firms might also learn about P2 
technologies from other firms in the same industry because they shared similar production 
technologies, supply chains, and trade publications (Dupuy, 1997; Harrington, 2008; Rothenberg 
and Zyglidopoulos, 2007). Thus learning from geographic or industrial neighbors could reduce 
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the information costs for other facilities and thus increasing the adoption of P2 in the next period. 
However, the performance of the P2 technology could be uncertain: negative shock by early 
adopters might have discouraged other facilities from adopting P2 in the next period. Since the 
objective of the PPA was set to encourage P2 through information exchange, an empirical 
examination is necessary to examine the effects of information spillovers on the adoption of P2.  
In addition to information spillovers, the adoption of P2 technologies might have been 
motivated in part by regulatory pressures and in part by other voluntary commitments such as the 
adoption of an environmental management system. Firms that faced more inspections were more 
likely to adopt P2 technologies to improve compliance in the future (Sam, 2009). Firms 
participated in the 33/50 program were more likely to voluntarily adopt Total Quality 
Environmental Management (TQEM) system that emphasized source reduction as an integral 
component in the production processes (Sam et al., 2009). Firms might have discovered P2 
opportunities or the cost-effectiveness of P2 while conducting those voluntary abatement efforts 
(Khanna et al. , 2009).  
Program participants also might have chosen other abatement methods instead of P2 to 
achieve pollution reduction. Though the 33/50 program was established to promote the P2 ethic, 
none of the existing studies have empirically examined whether program participation had 
motivated the adoption of P2 technologies. Furthermore, the effect of program participation 
might not be limited to the participants. Theoretically, the experiences of the participants could 
demonstrate the effectiveness of P2 and lead to more P2 adoption by neighbors that had not 
participated in the program (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007). Empirically, such demonstration effect 
needs to be investigated because it depends on the effectiveness of the P2 technologies and the 
effect of information spillover.  
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The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, we examine the extent to which the adoption 
of P2 technology was motivated by peers’ prior P2 experience after controlling for pressures of 
mandatory regulations and voluntary program participation. Since facilities were more likely to 
learn from other facilities using the same types of chemicals, we separate the number of P2 
technologies into P2 technologies adopted for 33/50 chemicals and the rest of the TRI chemicals. 
We examine the effect of neighbors’ P2 experience on the adoption of P2 technologies for the 
respective chemicals. Second, we examine the extent to which program participation motivated 
P2 adoption for program participants and whether their experiences increased P2 adoption 
among neighbors.  
To answer these questions, we conduct an empirical analysis on 6974 facilities that were 
eligible for the voluntary 33/50 program over the periods of 1991-1995. We estimate the number 
of P2 technologies adopted for 33/50 and rest of the TRI chemicals at the facility level with 
respect to the program participation, compliance costs to regulations, past P2 adoption by the 
neighbors, and the program participation ratio of the neighbors. We address the endogeneity of 
program participation with instrumental variables and control for location and industry fixed 
effects.  
Our analysis shows that there was positive information spillover among facilities within 
the same industry. After controlling for information spillovers and regulatory pressures, program 
participants adopted more P2 technologies for 33/50 chemicals than non-participants. Program 
participation had little impact on the adoption of P2 technologies for the rest of the TRI 
chemicals. We also find that the 33/50 program played a limited role in disseminating P2 
experiences from participants to other facilities, as we do not find a significant demonstration 
effect. Additionally, we find that facilities that emitted a greater amount of regulated toxic 
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releases adopted more P2 technologies, but the effects of other regulations varied by types of 
chemicals.  
3.2 Related Literature 
Existing literature has focused on the effects of environmental regulations on innovations 
in environmental technologies. Several empirical papers have been set forth to test the Porter 
hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) that stringent environmental regulations could 
provide incentives for firms to innovate and develop more cost-effective methods of achieving 
regulatory compliance. Among those studies, a few of them have used patent applications and 
R&D expenditures to approximate environmental technology innovations and have used 
pollution abatement expenditures as proxies for compliance costs (Jaffe, et al., 2002). Other 
studies have tested the Porter hypothesis by examining the relationship between stringent 
environmental regulations and productivity (Berman and Bui, 2001; Gray and Shadbegian, 1998). 
Both types of empirical studies have yielded mixed conclusions. The conclusions are 
methodologically, time- and industry-specific. For example, studies on pulp and paper industry 
does not support the porter hypothesis (Press, 2007). Nevertheless, the general conclusions seem 
to be that environmental R&D and environmental patents applications were positively associated 
with the increase in pollution abatement expenditures and, in certain sectors, stringent 
regulations had increased the competitiveness of the firms.  
Other empirical studies have directly examined the effects of environmental regulations 
on the adoption and diffusion of new environmental technology. Snyder et al. (2003) study the 
effect of environmental regulation on the adoption of a new processing technology in the 
chlorine manufacturing industry. They find that regulations directly imposed on chlorine 
production had no significant impact on technology adoption. Instead, end-users of chlorine 
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products were more likely to exit the market due to the regulations. Kerr and Newell (2003) 
study the effects of various environmental policies on the adoption of a new technology by U.S. 
refineries during the lead phasedown period of 1971 -1995. They find that the regulations on fuel 
additives and car fleets were the dominant factors in the adoption of the new technology. In 
addition, a few studies use interviews and surveys to examine firm’s perceptions of 
environmental regulations and their decisions to adopt environmental technologies. For example, 
Dupuy (1997) find that firms undertake source reduction activities in anticipating greater 
enforcement stringency.  
Besides mandatory regulations, several empirical studies have examined the effects of 
voluntary programs in promoting environmental technology innovation, diffusion, and adoption. 
Cleff and Rennings (1999) find that firms perceived such voluntary programs as eco-labels and 
voluntary commitments to be important in encouraging product and process innovation. 
Rennings et al. (2006) use data from German firms certified by the Eco-Audit and Management 
Scheme (EMAS) instituted in 1995 and find that the greater level of EMAS implementation had 
a positive effect on environmental process innovation. They also find that the EMAS had 
facilitated information spillovers as firms compared their environmental reports with others to 
generate ideas on their own environmental innovations. Wagner (2008) uses survey data from a 
broader scope of European firms and finds that the probabilities of both product and process 
innovations increased as the level of implementation of Environmental Management Systems 
(EMS) increased. A few studies have also shown that 33/50 program participation had led some 
firms to adopt Total Quality Environmental Management (TQEM). Sam et al. (2009) find that 
33/50 program participants were more likely to adopt the TQEM system, a management system 
with emphasis on source reduction through product and process modifications. Khanna et al. 
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(2009) find that firms that adopted TQEM also adopted more P2 technologies, after controlling 
for level of pollution and endogenous TQEM adoption.  
Furthermore, a few empirical papers have examined the role of community pressure in 
motivating the adoption of environmental technology and find mixed evidence. Blackman and 
Bannister (1998) find that community pressures from competing firms and local organizations 
were more effective than regulatory pressures in inducing the adoption of clean technology in the 
unregulated manufacturing sector in Mexico. However, Harrington (2008) only finds weak 
evidence to support that community pressures motivated the adoption of P2 technology. 
Empirical and theoretical studies on technology adoption have noted that spillovers 
(social learning) occurring in networks leads to a greater adoption rate of new technology 
(Besley and Case, 1993; Doring and Schnellenbach, 2006; Griliches, 1957). A more recent study 
by Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) has used household level panel data in India and finds that 
farmers had higher profits and devoted more land to the high-yielding varieties if their neighbors 
were more experienced with the new technology. Munshi (2009) examines the adoption of high-
yielding varieties among rice and wheat growers in India and also finds positive social learning 
effects. Additionally, he points out that the learning effect was weaker for rice growers than for 
wheat growers, because the yields of high-yielding rice varieties fluctuated more due to a greater 
degree of heterogeneity in growing conditions and practices among rice growers. Typically, 
these types of studies have assumed the structure of the social networks that farmers from the 
same village were considered as neighbors through whom they learned about the new technology.  
In contrast to the above studies with observational data at the household level, the 
following studies have used individual level randomized experimental data. Instead of imposing 
the structure of the social networks, the following studies have surveyed individuals to identify 
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their social links. However, these studies have reached mixed conclusions on the effect of social 
learning on technology adoption. Kremer and Miguel (2007) have used a randomized experiment 
on the adoption of a deworming drug program in Africa and found that the participation rate of 
the deworming program was reduced when more friends (social contacts) were exposed to 
deworming. However, Oster and Thornton (2009) also have used a randomized experiment to 
examine peer effects on the adoption of a female hygiene technology in Nepal and found positive 
learning effect.  
Both papers have outlined and investigated the following two mechanisms that could lead 
to positive peer effects: imitation and learning from peers about how to effectively use a new 
technology. However, both note that adoption by others can also provide information on the 
benefits of a new technology. This mechanism could lead to either positive or negative learning 
effects, depending on the effectiveness of the technology. Though the deworming technology is 
easy to adopt, Kremer and Miguel (2007) find that the benefit of deworming is less clear due to 
individual- and time-specific shocks to a person’s health status. Oster and Thorton (2009) find 
that the female hygiene technology is difficult to use, but yields substantial benefit for all who 
have adopted it. In this case, learning about how to better use the technology leads to a greater 
adoption rate. Therefore, the conclusion on the effect of learning in the literature depends on the 
characteristics of the population and the effectiveness of the technology.  
Our paper contributes to existing studies in the following ways.  First, most empirical 
studies have focused on one specific technology to understand the effect of learning and 
technology adoption. We focus on a wide range of 33/50-eligible facilities and examine their 
adoptions of P2 technologies for 33/50 and for the rest of the TRI chemicals. To capture the 
effect of learning among neighbors, we include all TRI facilities within the same industry and 
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county and aggregate the number of P2 technologies adopted for 33/50 chemicals and the rest of 
TRI chemicals. We then examine the extent to which prior P2 experience of peers increased the 
adoption of P2 technologies by a facility on respective chemicals in the next period. Second, 
existing literature on voluntary environmental initiatives has examined the effect of program 
participation/certification on technology adoption; few have examined whether greater program 
participation by neighboring facilities led to a greater rate of P2 adoption. We include the 
percentages of program participants in the geographic and industrial networks to determine the 
indirect effect of program participation on other facilities. Third, previous studies on 
environmental regulation and technology adoption have focused on regulated pollutants. TRI 
chemicals are not directly regulated, but are indirectly regulated to the extent that they are 
precursors to regulated pollutants. We examine whether regulatory pressures were effective in 
motivating P2 adoption for those otherwise unregulated pollutants. We control for various 
regulatory pressures, such as designation of county attainment status, precursors to regulated 
pollutants, performance standards on Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP), and plant specific 
inspections and enforcement activities. In our analysis, we compare those regulatory pressures 
with voluntary 33/50 program participation and information spillovers. 
3.3 The Decision to Adopt P2 Technology 
P2 includes such activities as spill and leak prevention, cleaning method modification, 
process modification, inventory control, and input substitution. These activities have the 
potential to increase the productivity of pollution-generating inputs or the efficiency of TRI 
chemicals. Given the level of output, a production process with P2 has the potential to reduce the 
use of the TRI chemicals, which would then lead to a reduction of input costs and a reduction in 
total toxic wastes and the treatment costs associated with end-of-pipe cleanup. Hence, compared 
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to other pollution control methods, P2 could lead to financial gain (King and Lenox, 2002). The 
adoption of new P2 technology, however, requires greater coordination within the facility among 
different production activities and may involve the costs of searching for appropriate technology, 
product and process modification, and employee training (Jaffe, et al., 2003). Initially, there 
could also be a considerable amount of uncertainty about the performance of the new technology 
(Kemp, 1998).  
We assume a myopic facility makes the decision to adopt a P2 technology based on the 
expected net benefit of adoption. The process of adoption can be represented in two periods 
(Nakajima, 2007). In the first period, facilities with potentially higher net benefits from P2 
adoption decide to adopt the P2 technology, even in the absence of regulatory pressures and 
voluntary program participation. In the following period, upon observing the information 
generated by adopters in the first period, facilities that have not adopted P2 would update their 
expectations of the P2 technology and make their decisions to adopt or not adopt. The 
information from early adopters may include procedural knowledge (know-how) and the 
performance of the P2 may be influenced by a stochastic shock.  
Information on procedure know-how could increase the adoption of new technology, 
especially when the P2 technology is hard to use, but offers notable benefits (Oster and Thorton, 
2009). The magnitudes of the learning effects depend on the characteristics of the population 
(Munshi, 2009). The effects of learning are expected to be stronger for homogenous populations 
than for heterogeneous populations. The information on the performance (effectiveness) of the 
P2 technology however could either lead to a greater rate of adoption (Oster and Thorton, 2009) 
or could deter future adoption (Kremer and Miguel, 2007). We expect to find a positive spillover 
 59
effect when the P2 technology is effective and a negative or insignificant effect when the P2 
technology is ineffective.  
We focus on two types of neighbors (networks): facilities in the same county and in the 
same industry. Facilities that are located in the same areas could gain access to the know-how on 
the P2 technology (Besley and Case, 1993; Case, 1992) either through informal social 
interactions, shared common resources, or a combination of both (Downing and White, 1986) . 
Facilities may also learn about the P2 technology from other facilities in the same industry since 
they are also more likely to share their experiences through trade publications (Dupuy, 1997) and 
to look for new ideas from each other’s environmental reports (Rennings et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, related companies could be interested in exploring P2 opportunities if their 
common suppliers have started using P2 technology (Dupuy, 1997; Rothenberg and 
Zyglidopoulos, 2007).  
The first hypothesis we test is that facilities adopted more P2 technologies if their 
neighbors had adopted more P2 technologies in the previous period. We expect that the late 
adopters could learn on how to better use the P2 technologies through early adopters (Oster and 
Thornton, 2009). However, we might find insignificant or even negative learning effect , when 
facilities were heterogeneous (Munshi, 2004) or and when the P2 was ineffective (Kremer and 
Miguel, 2007). Therefore, evidence of the information spillovers remains an empirical question 
to investigate.  
The second hypothesis we test is that program participants adopted more P2 technologies 
than non-participants. Participants received public recognition for their proactive efforts, which 
reduced information asymmetry between the public and the firms. This could increase their 
incentives for other voluntary environmental efforts (Khanna and Anton, 2002). Program 
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participants might also have access to technical assistance from the government that could 
reduce the initial information barrier to adopting P2 technology (Howarth, et al., 2000; Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2007). Program participants might also have adopted more P2 since participation could 
led to internal change in the management philosophy and view toward environmental 
management, which encourage firms to reduce pollution at its source (Khanna, et al., 2009; Sam, 
et al., 2008). Firms might have recognized the advantages of eliminating some or more 
chemicals through P2 and thus reducing the need to report to TRI, thereby avoiding adverse 
publicity due to TRI releases. Additionally, program participants might have motivated other 
facilities to explore P2 opportunities through demonstration (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007), 
specifically through the geographic and industrial networks.  
The last hypothesis we test is that facilities adopted more P2 if there were more program 
participants in their geographic and industrial networks. Since the net effects of learning depend 
on the characteristics of the population and the effectiveness of the P2 technology, the effect of 
demonstration might also depend on the performance of the P2 technology adopted by program 
participants and the similarities between program participants and their neighbors.  
3.4 Empirical Method  
To investigate the effects of information spillovers on adoption of P2, we set up a two-
period model, as shown in equation [3-1]. The number of P2 technologies adopted by a facility in 
the current period depends on program participation iP , the facility’s anticipated compliance 
costs, adoption of P2 by neighbor facilities in the last period, location- and industry- specific 
effects, and public/community pressure. We aggregate the number of P2 technologies adopted by 
neighbor facilities in the last period assuming a facility updates its information on P2 adoption 
with respect to the total knowledge available in the networks. We use the lagged number of P2 
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technologies adopted by neighbors as explanatory variables to proxy for information effects, 
because the decisions to adopt P2 by the facility and its neighbors could be simultaneously 
determined.  
Additionally, unobserved common factors at the neighborhood level could confound the 
information spillover effect (Manski, 1993). To distinguish the effects of information spill over 
from contextual effects, we control the network fixed effects by including dummy variables at 
the county and industry levels. Furthermore, program participation could be endogenous to the 
decision to adopt P2 due to unobserved facility characteristics. To account for endogenous 
program participation, we use instrumental variables. 28 
                         1 1 2 1 3 4,it it i it i it itT X L G P uβ β β β− − −= + + + +                           [3-1] 
where itT  denotes the number of new P2 adopted by facility i over the period 1994-1995, X  
denotes a vector of facility specific explanatory variables , ' iL −  denotes a vector of proxies for 
information spillover effects in the previous period, 'iG  represents a vector of location and 
industry fixed effects, and itP  denotes program participation. 1isP =  for year t s≥ if the facility 
joined the program in year S , and 0isP =  otherwise 
3.4.1. Dependent Variables 
 We measure two sets of dependent variables: the number of P2 technologies adopted for 
33/50 chemicals and the number of new P2 technologies adopted for the rest of the TRI 
chemicals. We refer them as 33/50 P2 and Other P2 in our regressions. These two dependent 
variables are calculated for TRI facilities eligible for the 33/50 program. Since the reporting 
                                                 
28 Around half of the facilities studied reported zero P2 adoption. A probit model would be more appropriate in this 
case. However, we encountered convergence problems when including neighborhood fixed effects. We therefore use 
a linear 2SLS model here, as suggested by Angrist (Angrist, 2001).  Angrist shows that 2SLS yields similar results 
to those obtained using nonlinear estimation methods when estimating the average causal effect for limited 
dependent variables with endogenous variables. 
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threshold and requirement at the chemical level changes over time, we only focus on the 
chemicals that are part of the TRI throughout the study period. Out of 612 TRI chemicals, the 
reporting criteria remain constant for 295 chemicals in the study period. To calculate Other P2, 
we aggregate the total number of P2 technologies adopted for any of those 295 chemicals by 
facilities.   
3.4.2. Information Spillover 
 Due to data availability, we focus on two types of neighbors (networks), facilities in the 
same county and facilities in the same industry.  Facilities that have the same 3-digit SIC code 
are classified as belonging to the same industry. Although we focus on the 33/50–eligible 
facilities on the left-hand side, we include all TRI facilities to calculate the total number of 33/50 
P2s and other P2s adopted by neighboring facilities in the same county and industry. In the end, 
we have four types of ' iL − variables to approximate the stock of available knowledge. We refer 
these four variables as: Industry 33/50 P2, Industry Other P2, County 33/50 P2, and County 
Other P2. 
3.4.3. Number of Program Participants 
To examine whether the presence of program participants in the neighborhood would 
affect a facility’s P2 decision through demonstration, we include two variables: County 
Participation Ratio and Industry Participation Ratio. We calculate those ratios using the number 
of program participants in the same county and in the same industry divided by the total number 
of neighbors in the same county and in the same industry, respectively.  
3.4.4. Instrumental Variables for Program Participation 
 They are First Invitation Group, Firm’s Prior Reduction of 33/50 Releases, and 
Facility’s Share of TRI releases of Parent Company. We have provided a detailed discussion on 
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these variables and shown that these are correlated with the participation decision in Chapter 2. 
To ensure the identification of equation [3-1], we argue that two of these variables are less likely 
to be correlated with a facility’s P2 adoption, except through a facility’s participation. We 
include the last variable in the determinants of P2 adoption for other TRI chemicals, and a 
detailed discussion is provided below.  
The first excluded instrumental variable is First Invitation Group. It is not likely to 
directly affect P2 adoption at the facility level except through the facility’s program participation, 
because parent companies typically have multiple facilities, and not all of which participated in 
the program. The second excluded instrumental variable is Firm’s Prior Reduction of 33/50 
Releases. It is also considered to be exogenous to P2 adoption from 1991 onward because the 
reduction of 33/50 releases preceded the mandatory reporting of P2 in the TRI, and this variable 
is defined at the parent company level. Since it focuses on 33/50 chemicals, it is likely to affect 
the P2 adoption for 33/50 chemicals, but only through the facility’s participation in the program.  
The last variable is the Facility’s Share of TRI releases of Parent Company. We have 
shown in Chapter 2 that the relatively larger TRI emitters within a parent company were more 
likely to participate in the program. Since this variable is defined with pre-program 
characteristics and includes all TRI chemicals, it is unlikely to be correlated with P2 adoption of 
33/50 chemicals in 1991-1995, except through program participation. However, since this 
variable includes all other TRI chemicals, it could be correlated with P2 adoption of other TRI 
chemicals. We conduct an orthogonal test on this variable using the procedure described in 
Baum et al. (2003). We find this variable directly affect the decision to adopt P2 for other TRI 
chemicals but does not directly affect the decision to adopt P2 for 33/50 chemicals. We therefore 
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include this variable as an explanatory variable when estimating the determinants of P2 adoption 
for other TRI chemicals.  
3.4.5. Other Explanatory Variables 
 We include the following variables to approximate the existing and anticipated 
regulatory pressures at the facility level, and these explanatory variables influence both P2 and 
program participation decisions. We use the sum of releases of chemicals included in various 
environmental regulations to approximate the existing costs of compliance. These chemicals 
include precursors of the criteria for air pollutants (Greenstone, 2003), toxic chemicals specified 
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), chemicals known as Extremely 
Hazardous Substances listed in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA), chemicals included in the Comprehensive Environmental Response Act (CERLA, 
commonly known as Superfund), and chemicals included in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). We refer this variable as Regulated Releases in our regressions 
and it is in logarithmic form. We expect to see a positive association between regulated releases 
and P2 adoption, provided there is a certain level of synergy between regulated pollutants and 
unregulated TRI chemicals. We include one variable, Total Inspections, to represent regulatory 
enforcement activities. This variable includes the total number of inspections levied on a facility 
under the CAA, Clean Water Act (CWA), and RCRA. To proxy the anticipated compliance costs, 
we use the ratio of HAP releases to total TRI releases at the facility level, denoted as the HAP-
TRI ratio. To avoid simultaneity, these variables defined at the facility level are lagged by one 
year in equation [3-1]. 
In addition, we control for the number of chemicals reported at the inception of the TRI, 
since the number of P2 technologies adopted is positively associated with the number of 
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chemicals used by the facilities. We refer this variable as Number of Core Chemicals, and it is 
defined as the total number of TRI chemicals reported in 1988.  
We have the following variables to control for county- and state level-regulatory 
stringency. These variables are shown to be correlated with the change of toxic releases and 
program participation in Chapter 2. These variables are: County Nonattainment Status, County 
Median Income (household income), and State LCV Score.  
3.5 Data Description 
The TRI dataset provides chemical-specific P2 adoptions and releases, names of the 
parent companies, industry classifications, and the locations of the TRI facilities. We compile a 
panel dataset for all TRI facilities for the period of 1991-1995, from which we identity the 33/50-
eligible facilities. Since we focus on information spillover within counties and industries, we 
exclude the counties and industries that only had a few TRI facilities. 29  Because of this 
restriction we have a balanced panel data set with 6974 facilities classified in 107 industries and 
752 counties. We identify 605 facilities as program participants.30  
We obtain the list of TRI chemicals that are precursors of the criteria air pollutants from 
Greenstone (2003) . The list of TRI chemicals targeted by various environmental regulations and 
the information on chemical deletions and modifications come from the EPA (U.S. 
Enviornmental Protection Agency, 2010 a,b ) . 
Facility-specific data on the numbers of violations, penalties, and inspections for 
compliance with the CAA, CWA, and RCRA are obtained from the EPA’s Integrated Data for 
Enforcement Analysis System (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007a). These data are 
merged with the TRI data using the unique TRI identifier for each facility. The reported location 
                                                 
29 We drop the counties that had fewer than 5 TRI facilities and industries that had fewer than 10 TRI facilities in 
any given year from 1991 to 1995. 
30 In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we have included 1335 participating facilities without the restriction.  
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of a facility in the TRI dataset is used to merge the above data with each county’s median income 
from the 1990 census as well as with the county’s attainment status (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2007b) and with state-level scores on environmental legislation (League of 
Conservation Voters, 2007). We present the summary statistics on the variables used in the 
regressions in Table 3.1. 
3.6 Results  
3.6.1. Program Participation and P2 adoption 
First, we estimate the effects of program participation and regulatory pressures on P2 
adoption over the period of 1992-1995. Table 3.2 presents the results on 33/50 P2 and Table 3.3 
presents the results on other P2. 
 We find that, in the absence of information spillover, program participants adopted more 
33/50 P2s (Table 3.2, Row 1). Across all models in Table 4.2, program participants adopted 
1.007 to 1.217 more P2 technologies for 33/50 chemicals, as compared to the non-participants. 
We also find that facilities emitting a larger amount of regulated releases adopted more P2 for 
33/50 chemicals (Table 3.2, Row 3). Contrary to previous studies (Khanna, et al., 2009; 
Harrington, et al., 2008) , we do not find that a greater rate of inspections caused the facilities to 
adopt more P2s (Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, Row 4). Since chemicals are part of the 189 chemicals 
that are listed as Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP), the future regulation on HAP pollutants 
created incentives for facilities to adopt P2 technologies. We find that facilities had greater HAP-
TRI ratio adopted more 33/50 P2 technologies (Table 3.2, Row 4). Previous studies raise the 
concern that the facilities in a nonattainment county were more likely to use end-of-pipe 
abatement methods, such as scrubbers, to control air pollutants (Greenstone, 2003). We find 
weak evidence that the designation of county attainment status on criteria air pollutants 
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encouraged P2 adoption. The effects of county non-attainment status were positive and 
statistically significant before we include county fixed effects and industry fixed effects (Table 
3.2 and Table 3.3, Row 5). This could be due to the fact that few counties had attainment statuses 
varied over time. Facilities that reported a greater number of chemicals in 1988 adopted more 
P2s for 33/50 chemicals. In addition, there was a negative trend in the number of P2 technologies 
adopted for 33/50 chemicals, as the time dummies were statistically significant and negative. 
Since the TRI facilities only report the incremental P2 activities on an annual basis, the marginal 
cost of abatement was likely to increase with additional P2 technologies adopted. We have 
observed the decline of 33/50 releases, particularly in the beginning of the program (Chapter 2). 
It is likely that facilities exhausted their P2 opportunities at the beginning of the program. 
Therefore, we observe a negative trend in the number of 33/50 P2s. 
 Similar to the findings in Table 3.2, we find that facilities emitting a greater amount of 
regulated releases and reporting a greater number of chemicals in 1988 adopted more other P2s 
(Table 3.3). Though the 33/50 program did not target other TRI chemicals, it is speculated that 
program participation might have spurred changes in environmental management philosophy, 
which could encourage the adoption of P2 technologies in general. However, the effect of 
program participation was limited to 33/50 chemicals. Program participation had no impact on 
the number of other P2s adopted (Table 3.3, Row 1). Facility that accounted for larger share of 
TRI releases by the parent company adopted fewer P2s for other TRI chemicals (Table 3.3, Row 
2). Future regulation on the HAP chemicals did not encourage the adoption of P2 for other TRI 
chemicals. On the contrary, it had a negative effect on other P2 adopted (Table 3.3, Row 4). 
Furthermore, the State LCV scores did not have any impact on the adoption of 33/50 P2 but we 
find weak evidence that it discouraged the adoption of other P2 (Table 3.3, Row 7). While we 
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find a negative trend in the adoption of 33/50 P2s, we do not observe a significant time trend in 
the adoption of other P2s.  
3.6.2. Information Spillovers and P2 adoption  
Second, we examine the effects of information spillovers on P2 adoption for 33/50 
chemicals and other TRI chemicals in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, respectively. Consistent with our 
findings in Table 3.2, the effect of program participation on 33/50 P2 was statistically significant 
across all models in Table 4.4 (Table 3.4, Row 1).  
The effects of 33/50 P2s adopted by neighbors on the adoption of 33/50 P2 by a facility 
are examined in the following ways. Models XI to XIV examine the information spillovers in the 
same industry. We start with a parsimonious specification in Model XI with the effect of 
program participation and the number of 33/50 P2s adopted by industry neighbors. We add the 
participation ratio in the industry in Model XII. We include the industry fixed effects and 
exclude the industry program participation ratio in Model XIII, and include both participation 
ratio and industry fixed effects in Model XIV. 
We find that the total number of 33/50 P2s adopted by other facilities in the same 
industry increased the number of 33/50 P2 adopted by a facility (Table 3.4, Row 5). One 
additional increase in the number of P2 adopted by neighbors led to a 0.001 increase in the 
number of 33/50 P2 adopted by a facility. This effect was small compared to the direct impacts 
of program participation and regulatory pressures. A typical industry in our sample had on the 
average 415 facilities. Even if half the facilities had adopted 33/50 P2 technologies in the last 
period, the likelihood of 33/50 P2 adoption by a facility in that industry would only increase by 
20%. We do not find that a higher ratio of program participants in the industry increased the 
number of 33/50 P2s adopted by a facility (Table 3.4, Row 6).  
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Models XV to XVIII examine the information spillovers in the same county. Model XV 
examines the effect of program participation and the number of 33/50 P2s adopted by neighbors 
in the same county. We add the participation ratio in the county in Model XVI. We include the 
county fixed effects and exclude the county participation ratio in Model XVII, and include both 
the participation ratio and county fixed effects in Model XVIII. 
We find that 33/50 P2s adopted by other facilities in the same county did not significantly 
increase the number of 33/50 P2 adopted by a facility, after the county fixed effects are included 
(Table 3.4, Row 7). Moreover, we do not find that a higher ratio of program participants in the 
county increased the adoption of 33/50 P2 after controlling for information spillovers among the 
neighbors (Table 3.4, Row 9). 
Table 3.5 presents the results on the effects of information spillovers for other P2. The 
models in Table 3.5 follow the same order as the ones in Table 3.4. Across all the models, we do 
not find that 33/50 program participation caused participants to adopt more P2 technologies for 
other TRI chemicals. We find that other P2s adopted by facilities in the same industry increased 
the number of other P2s adopted by a facility. The magnitudes of the information spillovers are 
similar to the ones reported in Table 3.4. Additionally, we find that the effect of information 
spillover in the county was not significant after controlling for county fixed effects. The program 
participation ratios in the county and industry did not significantly affect the adoption of other P2.  
In sum, our results indicate that facilities were more likely to learn from their industry 
peers on how to adopt P2 technologies. The direct impact of program participation was only 
evident for chemicals targeted by the program. The pressures from regulations influenced the 
adoption of 33/50 P2 and other P2 differently. Greater ratios of program participation in the 
networks did not significantly motivate P2 adoption.  
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3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we use the data from 6974 facilities that were eligible for the voluntary 
33/50 program to examine the extent to which program participation and information spillover 
motivated P2 adoption for both 33/50 chemicals and other TRI chemicals. We use the one-year 
lagged total number of P2 adopted by other TRI facilities in the same county and industry to 
approximate the available knowledge on P2. After controlling for endogenous program 
participation and the fixed effects at the county and industry levels, we find that the effects of 
information spillovers differed by types of chemicals and types of neighborhoods.  
Though the voluntary program was not intended to address pollution problems associated 
with other TRI chemicals, a few researchers have argued that voluntary programs can be used to 
promote environmental technology change by providing informational subsidies in terms of 
technical assistance on the adoption of best practice (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007).  
Our findings indicate that if policy makers were to rely solely on the information 
spillover to generate technology change, there could be several limitations on the effectiveness of 
information subsidies. First of all, the magnitude of the effects could be relatively small in 
comparison to the direct impacts of regulatory pressures. The information generated by early 
adopters could be relevant only to facilities in the same industry that have similar production 
technologies and outputs. Future policies to encourage the adoption of new environmental 
technology should thus focus on firms that are closely related to one another.  
Second, the direct impact of the voluntary program on P2 was limited to the targeted 
chemicals only. Facilities were not motivated to adopt more P2 in the presence of participants in 
their geographic and industrial networks. These results could be explained by the fact that the P2 
technologies reported by TRI facilities were chemical-specific and did not include other 
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information on changes in environmental management systems. Nevertheless, they suggest that 
voluntary programs targeted at certain toxic chemicals may not induce environmental technology 
change to address a wide spectrum of toxic pollution problems.  
Last, it is essential to keep in mind that the effects of information spillovers may vary by 
the type of networks through which firms interact with each other. Previous studies find that the 
effect of learning was weaker for a heterogeneous population (Munshi, 2004). We find that 
facilities in the same industry were more likely to learn from each other, but facilities from the 
same county were less likely to do so. This result suggests that there are greater similarities 
between industry neighbors than between geographic neighbors. In that sense, facilities may 
have stronger incentives to imitate their industry peers or to learn how to better use a technology 
from their industry peers. Due to data availability, we have assumed that facilities in the same 
industry and in the same county are more likely to learn from each other, and we have treated the 
neighbors from the same county and the same industry as equally important. Our results suggest 
two possible extensions that future studies could explore. First, information from industry peers 
should probably be given greater weight than information from the geographic neighbors when 
examining adoption and diffusion of environmental technology. Second, we do not have 
information on the supply chains through which facilities are connected. Within the same 
industry, facilities may have learned more from the peers with whom they share common 
suppliers or end-users. Thus, those peers should be given greater weight than the rest of the 
facilities in the industry. Future study on information spillovers could address this limitation by 
constructing industry networks with information on supply chains.  
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3.8 Tables  
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics, 1991-1995.  
Variables  Mean Std. Min Max 
First invitation group 0.371 0.483 0.0 1.0 
Program participation  0.126 0.332 0.0 1.0 
Facility's share of TRI releases of parent company 0.411 0.424 0.0 1.0 
Prior reduction of 33/50 releases(thousand pounds) 0.495 2.053 -57.0 16.9 
Number of core chemicals in 1988 4.296 5.069 0.0 80.0 
Regulated releases in 1988(Log) 11.895 2.918 0.0 19.5 
All inspections 1.160 1.774 0.0 22.0 
HAP-TRI 0.795 0.275 0.0 1.0 
     
Number of 33/50 P2s adopted  3.596 6.151 0.0 84.0 
Number of Other P2s adopted  2.968 8.082 0.0 112.0 
     
Industry Participation Ratio 4.480 2.835 0.0 18.2 
Industry 33/50 P2s  971.708 965.754 5.0 4337.0
Industry Other P2s  945.404 1006.370 0.0 3779.0
County 33/50 P2s  171.257 307.301 0.0 1686.0
County Other P2s  165.287 284.313 0.0 1481.0
County Participation Ratio 3.763 4.508 0.0 60.0 
     
County non-attainment status 0.978 0.887 0.0 3.0 
County median income(thousand dollars) 30.956 6.724 15.9 56.3 
State LCV score 37.681 23.778 0.0 196.0 
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Table 3.2 Determinants of P2 Adoption: Program Participation Effects on  
Adoption of 33/50 P2 Adopted, 1992-1995. 
Variables 
I 
33/50 P2 
II 
33/50 P2 
III  
33/50 P2 
IV  
33/50 P2 
V 
33/50 P2 
Program Participation  1.165** 1.217** 1.210** 1.200** 1.007* 
 [0.563] [0.584] [0.617] [0.556] [0.594] 
Regulated releases in 1988  0.060*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] 
All inspections -0.031** -0.031** -0.031** -0.024* 0 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
HAP-TRI 0.407*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 0.353*** 0.096* 
 [0.064] [0.064] [0.064] [0.065] [0.057] 
County Nonattainment Status 0.048** 0.048** 0.048** 0.054 0.028 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.053] [0.024] 
LCV score 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of core chemicals in 1988 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] 
County median income 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.001 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.051] [0.004] 
County Participation Ratio  -0.007  0.008  
  [0.007]  [0.007]  
Industry participation ratio   -0.005  -0.008 
   [0.013]  [0.014] 
Year 1992 -0.384*** -0.377*** -0.382*** 0.180*** -0.856*** 
 [0.119] [0.120] [0.120] [0.029] [0.247] 
Year 1993 -0.402*** -0.386*** -0.393*** 0.152*** -0.867*** 
 [0.119] [0.122] [0.123] [0.024] [0.248] 
Year 1994 -0.455*** -0.439*** -0.446*** 0.097*** -0.918*** 
 [0.118] [0.120] [0.122] [0.019] [0.248] 
Year 1995 -0.551*** -0.535*** -0.541*** -0.581*** -1.012*** 
 [0.118] [0.120] [0.122] [0.117] [0.248] 
County fixed effects    Included  
Industry fixed effects     Included 
Observations 27,896 27,896 27,896 27,896 27,896 
Number of facilities  6974 6974 6974 6974 6974 
R-squared 0.23 0.229 0.229 0.297 0.279 
P-Value of over identification test 0.275 0.291 0.28 0.37 0.205 
Weak identification test 40*** 37.86*** 35.72*** 43.34*** 36.01*** 
Note: Models are estimated on a balanced panel using pooled 2SLS. Instrumental variables for the participation 
variable include first invitation group, firm’s prior reduction of 33/50 releases and facility’s share of TRI releases in 
the parent company. Robust standard errors clustered at the facility level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 3.3 Determinants of P2 Adoption: Program Participation Effects on Adoption of 
Other P2, 1992-1995. 
Variables 
VI 
Other P2
VII 
Other P2
VIII  
Other P2 
IX  
Other P2 
X 
Other P2
Program Participation  0.028 0.141 0.26 0.189 1.278 
 [0.855] [0.958] [1.203] [0.811] [1.107] 
Facility's share of TRI releases of parent company -0.208*** -0.220*** -0.232** -0.199*** -0.296***
 [0.067] [0.075] [0.091] [0.072] [0.087] 
Regulated releases in 1988  0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.047***
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
All inspections -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 -0.014 -0.011 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] 
HAP-TRI -0.293*** -0.295*** -0.295*** -0.259*** -0.472***
 [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.081] [0.079] 
County Nonattainment Status 0.046* 0.047* 0.047* 0.074 0.02 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.050] [0.028] 
LCV score -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0 -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of core chemicals in 1988 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.185*** 0.152***
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] 
County median income 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.099 0 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.096] [0.004] 
County Participation Ratio  -0.008  -0.007  
  [0.010]  [0.009]  
Industry participation ratio   -0.014  -0.023 
   [0.021]  [0.021] 
Year 1992 0.128 0.141 0.142 0.113*** -0.206 
 [0.135] [0.139] [0.143] [0.036] [0.328] 
Year 1993 0.13 0.153 0.162 0.109*** -0.188 
 [0.134] [0.143] [0.154] [0.029] [0.328] 
Year 1994 0.09 0.112 0.122 0.073*** -0.233 
 [0.133] [0.141] [0.151] [0.021] [0.328] 
Year 1995 0.001 0.023 0.033 -0.149 -0.314 
 [0.132] [0.140] [0.149] [0.186] [0.329] 
County fixed effects    Included  
Industry fixed effects     Included
Observations 27,896 27,896 27,896 27,896 27,896 
Number of facilities  6974 6974 6974 6974 6974 
R-squared 0.191 0.191 0.19 0.252 0.207 
P-Value of over identification test 0.823 0.798 0.741 0.924 0.714 
Weak identification test 47.08 37.67 21.04 56.07 25.39 
Models are estimated on a balanced panel using pooled 2SLS. Instrumental variables for the participation variable 
include first invitation group, and firm’s prior reduction of 33/50 releases. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
facility level in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 4 Pollution Prevention by the Voluntary 33/50 Program: 
Implications for Toxic Releases and Recycling 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Over the last decade, policy makers have emphasized their preference for P2 31 over end-
of-pipe control methods. This follows the recognition that P2 has the potential to eliminate and 
reduce the quantity of hazardous pollutants at source before the point of generation through 
changes in input use and manufacturing processes. When compared to P2 techniques, recycling 
procedures are most likely to take place after the pollutants have been generated. Moreover, 
recycling procedures are mostly designed to recover valuable materials that can be reused in 
manufacturing processes rather than to eliminate the wastes from the source. Therefore, using 
recycling methods may result in shifting pollutants across environmental media. Additionally, 
storage, transportation and recovery of recycled chemicals could still pose potential 
environmental risks, since recycling processes may generate their own pollution and waste 
materials that cannot be recovered from recycling have to be treated or disposed elsewhere.  
 Given these advantage of P2 over other pollution control methods, the National Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1990 (PPA) established P2 as the preferred approach in the pollution control 
hierarchy, and declared that “pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source whenever 
feasible, pollution that cannot be prevented should be recycled in an environmentally safe 
manner whenever feasible; pollution that cannot be prevented or recycled should be treated in an 
environmentally safe manner, and disposal or other release into the environment should only be 
employed as the last resort and should be conducted in an environmentally safe manner”(U.S. 
                                                 
31 EPA defines P2 as “reducing or eliminating waste at the source by modifying production processes, promoting the 
use of non-toxic or less-toxic substances, implementing conservation techniques, and re-using materials rather than 
putting them into the waste stream.” It is used interchangeably with source reduction (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2006). 
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Environmental Protection Agency, 1990). To promote public support and record the progress on 
P2, the PPA also amended the TRI by requiring additional reporting on waste management and 
P2 activities.  
To encourage a more holistic approach to pollution control and create an ethic of P2, 
several voluntary environmental programs have been initiated (Khanna, 2006). This chapter 
focuses on the first, the 33/50 voluntary program, which encouraged P2 as the preferred 
approach to abate 33/50 releases. To encourage a reduction in releases to all media, the program 
did not set chemical- or media-specific targets. Firms were given the flexibility to select 
abatement methods and set their own reduction targets, but were encouraged to modify 
production processes, substitute input chemicals, and adopt P2 technologies to reduce their 
emissions from source.  
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that participating firms were motivated to choose P2 as their 
top priority and seek methods to reduce pollution from source, in order to meet their commitment 
to the 33/50 program (Zats and Harbour, 1999). One research also shows that 33/50 participation 
led some firms to adopt Total Quality Environmental Management (TQEM) that incorporates 
environmental quality attributes into product and process development, and emphasizes a 
philosophy of reduction of wastes at source (Khanna, et al., 2009; Sam, et al., 2009). Such firms 
might have been more likely to resort to P2 to reduce 33/50 releases as they recognized the cost-
savings and efficiency gains associated with P2.  
 However, the 33/50 program might have led to other abatement methods that were lower 
in the pollution control hierarchy. 33/50 program only targeted reductions in aggregate on-site 
and off-site releases and did not specify any goals for reduction in total waste. Since P2 was a 
relatively new concept to firms in the early 1990s, adopters could face costs of learning, 
 81
searching, and uncertainties. As a result, program participants might have used abatement 
methods that were more likely to be readily available instead of P2 to reduce 33/50 releases. One 
study finds that 33/50 program participants significantly increased their transfers for off-site 
recycling than non-participants in all industrial sectors, except for facilities in the chemical sector 
(Gamper-Rabindran, 2006). In that sense, the 33/50 program might resulted in an increase in 
total 33/50 emissions. 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, we seek to examine the extent to which any 
reductions in 33/50 releases were achieved using P2 methods. Despite the recognition of P2 as 
the preferred approach to reduce pollution by policy makers, few empirical papers have 
examined the effectiveness of P2 in reducing toxic wastes (except for Harrington et al. (2008)). 
Facilities might adopt P2 simply to provide an outward signal of their efforts to be 
environmentally friendly, but might not have made any fundamental changes in their operations. 
Even if P2 was adopted and implemented successfully, P2 might have improved production 
efficiency and reduced pollution intensity. This might enable firms to produce more outputs 
which led to an increase in 33/50 releases.  
Given that the effect of P2 adoption on toxic emissions might depend on total production, 
we examine the effects of P2 technologies separately for the Ozone Depleting (OD) chemicals 
and the rest of the 33/50 chemicals, since the OD chemicals were required by the Montreal 
Protocol to be phased out by 1996. Facilities might have to adopt P2 to modify their production 
processes and to substitute inputs in order to eliminate OD chemicals. In addition, we also 
consider the impact of P2 on the release of 33/50 chemicals based on toxicity of the chemicals. 
Facilities might have favored adoption of P2 to reduce or eliminate the use of highly toxic 
chemicals, thus avoid pubic and regulatory scrutiny created by being reported to the TRI.  
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Second, we examine the extent to which program participation led to an increase in 
recycling of 33/50 chemicals implying greater use of recycling methods. The amount of 33/50 
chemicals transferred off-site for recycling and recycled and recovered at the facility could 
indicate that firms were using recycling, although detailed information on pollution control 
methods other than recycling is not available at the facility level. Program participation could 
cause a faster growth in recycling when program participants used recycling methods to abate 
direct releases in order to meet their commitments to the program. Program participation could 
also trigger the adoption of other pollution control methods that reduced releases and recycling 
of 33/50 chemicals, depending on the costs of recycling vs. other methods. Furthermore, 
facilities might have to face different costs between conducting on-site recycling themselves and 
transferring to an off-site recycler. For this reason it is likely that program participation might 
have affected on-site and off-site recycling differently. Thus we not only examine the effect of 
program participation on total recycling but also examine on-site and off-site recycling 
separately.  
Last, we examine whether the change in recycling was inversely related to the adoption 
of P2 technologies. The effect of P2 on recycling of 33/50 chemicals could be ambiguous 
because it depends on total production and the performance of P2. The use of P2 could reduce 
the amount of wastes to be recycled if it reduced the generation of pollution at source. However, 
P2 might also have induced firms to increase total production, which could increase total wastes 
to be recycled.  
To answer these three questions, we undertake the empirical analysis using facility level 
information on toxic releases, P2 adoption and voluntary program participation of 8756 facilities 
for the period of 1988 to 1995 in 48 states of the US. We use Generalized Method of Moments 
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(GMM) estimation with instrumental variables to estimate the effect of P2 and program 
participation on three types of emissions (releases, on-site and off-site recycling), while 
controlling for the effects of various regulatory and public pressures on facilities to reduce 33/50 
releases and endogenous program participation and P2 adoption.  
We find that both program participants and non-participants increased off-site recycling 
of 33/50 chemicals during the program period. However, program participants had significantly 
lower rate of increase as compared to non-participants. Meanwhile, program participation had no 
statistically significant impact on on-site recycling of 33/50 chemicals. These two findings imply 
that program participants had a statistically significant lower rate of increase in total recycling. 
We also find that program participation had a statistically significant negative effect on 33/50 
releases over and above the effect of P2 adoption. However, the adoption of P2 itself did not 
reduce 33/50 releases or recycling of 33/50 chemical, except for releases of OD chemicals. Thus 
participants might have used pollution control methods other than P2 and recycling to reduce 
releases, but the reduction in release of OD chemicals was primarily through P2.  
4.2 Related Literature 
Most empirical studies on voluntary environmental initiatives focus on explaining the 
incentives for firms to voluntarily reduce their TRI emissions. They show that regulatory 
pressures, negative publicity, and pressure from consumers, local residents, and environmental 
groups played a significant role in motivating firms to participate in voluntary programs and 
adopt environmental management systems (Anton, et al., 2004; Khanna, 2006; Khanna et al. 
2009; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Rivera et al., 2006). Several empirical studies have tried to 
quantify the economic motivations for voluntary reductions in toxic releases and found that high 
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levels of TRI emissions were associated with low market values (Hamilton, 1998) and TRI 
reduction led to better financial performance (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Konar and Cohen, 2001).  
Although previous studies have focused on incentives for P2 and determinants of P2 
diffusion, few empirical studies have examined the impact of P2 adoption on emissions or 
analyzed the effectiveness of P2 in comparison to other pollution control methods. A recent 
study by Harrington et al. (2008) examines the effect of P2 on onsite and off-site emissions and 
finds that P2 adoption had a statistically significant short term effect on the reduction of on-site 
releases, but did not significantly reduce cross-media transfers (from on-site releases to off-site 
disposals and recycling). 
A few studies have examined whether there is policy-induced substitution of pollution 
across media pathways and found mixed evidence. Greenstone (2003) studies the effect of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) on emissions to air, water and land in iron and steel 
industry. His research models the percentage change in pollutant releases to air, water, and land 
with respect to a county’s attainment status and finds that CAAA did not induce plants to 
substitute air release with water or land emission. Alberini (2001) studies the effect of regulation 
on the substitution between the aboveground and underground gasoline storage tanks in Florida. 
She finds that the change in the number of underground storage tanks was negatively correlated 
with change in the number of aboveground storage tanks right after more stringent regulations 
were imposed on underground storage tanks. Sigman (1996) tests if compliance with air 
regulations caused facilities to increase off-site transfers for recycling when chlorinated solvents 
were regulated, and finds that the regulation of air releases reduced the overall reliance on those 
chemicals, and thus reduced emissions across all media. However, the state tax for incineration 
had a positive and significant effect in determining the level of air emission, which suggests that 
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potential cross-media substitution between air releases and offsite recycling can occur when the 
cost of treatment increases.  
 Several studies have examined the effectiveness of 33/50 program in reducing 33/50 
releases, but the results are mixed. Khanna and Damon (1999) and Innes and Sam ( 2008) find 
that the program participation has a statistically significant negative impact on 33/50 releases, 
with the former study focuses on chemistry sector and the latter on a wide range of 
manufacturing sectors. Vidovic and Khanna (2007) argue that their finding vanishes if prior 
reductions in pollution achieved before the start of the program and time and fixed-effects are 
taken into account. Gamper-Rabindran (2006) focuses only on the 15 non-ozone depleting 
chemicals, arguing that the two OD chemicals were due to be phased out anyway under the 
Montreal Protocol. She finds that the impact of the program varied by industry and 
environmental media. Air releases in certain sectors reduced, while the transfers to off-site 
recycling facilities increased due to the program. More recently, Sam et al. (2009) find that even 
after controlling for other voluntary activities a firm might undertake, such as adoption of Total 
Quality Environmental Management (TQEM) system, program participation had a statistically 
significant negative impact on 33/50 releases even after participation period ended in 1995.  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, existing studies on the 
33/50 program have focused on examining the extent to which the reduction of 33/50 releases 
can be attributed to program participation. However, none of them have examined the 
mechanisms through which this reduction was achieved. Second, this paper uses facility-level 
data in contrast to other studies that were conducted at the firm level when examining the 
effectiveness of the 33/50 program with the exception of (Gamper-Rabindran, 2006). Using 
facility-level data in the analysis enables us to explore the interdependencies between releases, 
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recycling and P2 adoption at the micro level where these decisions were simultaneously 
determined by heterogeneous facility characteristics. Last, very few studies have looked at the 
effectiveness of P2 in reducing emissions. Harrington et al. (2008) examine the effect of P2 on 
TRI releases, but do not control for particular regulation or voluntary program participation. Sam 
et al. (2009) study the extent to which 33/50 program participants were more likely to adopt 
TQEM system, but they do not study any particular pollution control methods as a result of 
TQEM through which TRI releases are reduced. Unlike Alberini (2001) who observes the 
substitute technology directly or Sigman (1996) who has a proxy for the cost of alternative 
technology, we neither observe the costs nor the abatement technology that generate recycling of 
wastes. We analyze the effects of program participation on emissions to other media (recycling 
and incineration) to determine the extent to which that program participation might have led 
firms to adopt other pollution control methods that would result in cross-media transfers. This is 
an approach similar to Greenstone (2003). In doing so, we also parse out the effect of P2 that 
could have been motivated by program participation. Our paper not only examines the program’s 
effect on emissions to all media pathways, but also examines the indirect impact of program 
participation through P2 adoption and P2’s effect on emissions to all media pathways.  
4.3 Conceptual Framework 
We assume that a profit-maximizing facility will simultaneously decide on the optimal 
level of effort, such as the decision to participate in 33/50 program, type of pollution control 
method to use, and the extent of pollution reduction to maximize its net benefits. Since these are 
voluntary activities, a firm will only undertake them to the extent that they are in its self-interest. 
In the absence of regulations, the implicit reputation costs from adverse publicity associated with 
the publication of TRI since 1990 have become increasingly important in motivating firms to 
 87
reduce emissions beyond the legal mandates. Facilities may also take proactive efforts to 
preempt future regulations, gain goodwill from regulators and reduce regulatory scrutiny 
(Harrington, et al., 2008; Khanna, et al., 2009; Sam, 2009). Therefore, facilities that emit higher 
levels of release from regulated chemicals and face stronger regulatory pressures are more likely 
to participate in the program. Such facilities may also be more likely to adopt P2 as a way to 
increase internal efficiency and reduce regulatory scrutiny (Harrington, et al., 2008, Sam, 2009). 
The extent to which they do so would depend however on the costs of P2 versus other methods 
of pollution control, such as recycling and reuse.  
Program participation could also lead to an increase in recycled wastes when participants 
shifted greater proportion of emissions from direct releases to recycling facilities. Program 
participants may have preferred cleaning up at the end-of-pipe, since those methods offer 
immediate and observable result, do not involve learning costs, and significant investment (Hart 
and Ahuja, 1996; King and Lenox, 2002). If larger proportion of direct releases were abated 
using recycling methods, we may find that participants reduced the 33/50 releases but increased 
recycled wastes as compared to non-participants. The effect of the 33/50 program on total waste 
becomes unclear when taking into account both direct releases and recycled wastes.  
The adoption of P2 technology may not guarantee that direct releases would be reduced. 
The ambiguity arises because the adoption of P2 has the potential to reduce the intensity of 
pollution (measured by the pollution per unit of output) and average production cost, thus 
encourages greater production (Harrington et al., 2008). Since we do not observe total output, the 
effects of P2 on direct releases need to be empirically determined. On one hand, the adoption of 
P2 could reduce the use of recycling methods since emissions are prevented through source 
reduction activities. On the other hand, the adoption of P2 could reduce the cost of production, 
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which leads to greater production and more recycling. For the above reasons, the direct effect of 
P2 on recycling cannot be estimated. 
The effect of P2 on releases could vary by types of chemicals. Unlike the rest of the 
33/50 chemicals, two of the 33/50 chemicals are OD substances and had to be phased out by 
1996. This may have created the incentives for firms to apply source reduction methods and to 
look for substitutes. We may expect a significant negative effect of P2 on releases of OD 
chemicals, because of the mandatory regulation. The effect of P2 could also vary by toxicity of 
chemicals. Facilities that process highly toxic chemicals would face greater regulatory and public 
scrutiny on their toxic emissions thus would be more likely to use P2 to eliminate those 
chemicals from the TRI.  
4.4 Empirical Framework 
To examine the extent to which program participation and P2 adoption could lead to 
reduction in direct releases and emissions to recycling, we use the following equation [4-1] to 
show that the ith  facility’s emissions at a given year t  is determined by a vector of facility-
specific characteristics itX , the decision of program participation itP , the decision to adopt P2 itT , 
location and industry specific effects id and time effects. tλ . 
1 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it i t ity y X P T d uρ θ θ θ θ θ λ−Δ = Δ + Δ + + + + + Δ       [4-1]   
where  t=1991,..., 1995 1it it ity y y −Δ = − , 1 1 2it it ity y y− − −Δ = − 1it it itX X X −Δ = − , and 
1it it itu u u −Δ = Δ −Δ 32.  
The coefficient for program participation measures the effect of program participation on 
the change of emissions, which can be interpreted as the difference in the rate of emission 
                                                 
32 It is possible that the error term still has individual specific effects since program participation variable is not first 
differenced. The individual effects could be correlated with program participation and the adoption of P2. For this 
reason, we use instrumental variables for the endogenous program participation and P2 variables. 
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reduction between participants and non-participants when the dependent variables are in log 
form. A significant and negative coefficient would imply program participants experienced a 
greater rate of reduction in emissions than non-participants. The coefficient for the P2 adoption 
decision indicates the effect of P2 on the rate of change in emissions, after parsing out the effect 
of other abatement methods through program participation. A significant and negative coefficient 
would imply that facilities that adopted new P2 would have greater rate of reduction in emissions. 
We run three versions of equation [4-1], each with a different dependent variable. The three 
dependent variables are 33/50 releases, on-site recycling of 33/50 chemicals and offsite-recycling 
of 33/50 chemicals, respectively.  
We include the lagged dependent variable in equation [4-1] because several unobserved 
factors that influence emissions may change slowly over time, such as observe managerial, 
technical and organizational features of a facility; and emissions are likely to be autoregressive 
as outputs are autoregressive. However, we do not include lagged recycling when estimating 
change in recycling using equation [4-1] because we do not find strong autocorrelation in the 
recycling process probably due to the shorter reporting period33.  
Since the lagged dependent variable in equation [4-1] is correlated with the error term, 
we use two-year and earlier lags of the dependent variable as GMM instruments(Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). Furthermore, unobserved facility characteristics could influence both decisions to 
adopt P2 and to participate in the voluntary 33/50 program and the changes of direct releases and 
recycling.  In order to control for endogenous program participation and P2 variables, we use 
                                                 
33 Our analysis of the impact of the participation in recycling is constrained to the period 1992-1996, because the 
reporting of recycling only started in 1991 and taking first difference leaves us observations from 1992 onward. 
Furthermore, unlike the reporting of direct releases that started with the inception of TRI in 1988, the reporting of 
recycling was fairly new to TRI facilities at that time. Due to these reasons, we do not find a significant strong 
autocorrelation in the recycling generating process. For these reasons, we do not include the lagged recycling 
variable when estimating the effects of P2 and participation on recycling.  
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instrumental variables 1Z for P2 adoption and 2Z for participation when estimating equation [4-1]. 
To ensure identification, the Z  variables are hypothesized to influence participation and P2 
adoption but are uncorrelated with changes in releases and recycling.  In the next section we 
describe the choice of these variables in detail.  
4.5 Variable Construction  
4.5.1. Dependent Variables 
We define releases as onsite emissions to water, air, land, and transfers to off-site 
disposals and treatment. We estimate the effects of P2 and program participation on four types of 
releases: releases of the 33/50 chemicals, releases from OD chemicals, releases from the rest of 
the 33/50 chemicals, and toxicity-weighted releases of 33/50 chemicals. We refer to them as 
33/50 Releases, OD Releases, non-OD Releases and Toxicity- Weighted Releases in the 
regressions.  
Since 1991, TRI facilities have been required to report the quantities of toxic chemicals 
recycled, treated and used for energy recovery (incineration) on-site and off-site. We estimate the 
effects of P2 and program participation on three types of recycling:, 33/50 chemicals transferred 
off-site for recycling and energy recovery, 33/50 chemicals recycled and recovered on-site, and 
total amount of chemicals for recycling. We refer them as Total Recycling, Off-site Recycling 
and On-site Recycling. We take logarithm on all of these dependent variables then take the first 
differences of them and use that as the dependent variable in equation [4-1].  
4.5.2. P2 Variables 
 Firms are required to disclose the number of incremental P2 activities adopted for each 
chemical to the TRI starting from 1991 onwards. There are 43 types of activities reported and 
those can be classified into eight broad categories: (1) good operation practices, (2) inventory 
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control, (3) spill and leak prevention, (4) raw material modifications, (5) process modifications, 
(6) cleaning and degreasing, (7) surface preparation and finishing, (8) product 
modifications(Khanna, et al., 2009). 
 We have two alternative variables to measure the adoption of P2 by a facility ( itT ). The 
first one is a binary variable and it equals 1 if a facility had adopted P2 for any of the 33/50 
chemicals in a given year, and zero otherwise. We refer to it as Adopt P2. We do so because 
most facilities reported zero P2 activities across all chemicals for a given year. To check for the 
robustness of our results with respect to this specification, we then aggregate the number of 
incremental P2 activities across 17 33/50 chemicals for each year by facility and include it in 
equation [4-1] instead of the binary P2 variable. We refer to it as Number of P2s in the 
regressions.   
4.5.3. Other Independent Variables 
The binary participation variable ( itP ) is defined as 1isP =  for t s≥ if the facility joined 
the program in year s , and 0isP =  otherwise. 
We include the following variables to approximate regulatory pressures, and county and 
state environmental regulator stringency, as these variables are shown to be correlated with 
program participation and 33/50 releases in Chapter 2. Specifically, they are Number of 
Inspections, HAP-TRI ratio, County Non-attainment Status, and State LCV Scores. Industry 
effects are controlled by ten industry dummies, classified by the facility’s primary 2-digit SIC 
code. Time dummies control time effects. Variables to control for location effects include 
County Median Income (in thousand dollars) in which a TRI facility was located. 
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4.5.4. Endogenous Program Participation and Identification 
We use three instrumental variables that are correlated with program participation to 
identify the effect of program participation in equation [3-1]. They are First Invitation Group, 
Facility’s Share of Total TRI Releases of the Parent Company, and Firm’s Prior Change in 
33/50 Releases. In Chapter 2 we have provided a detailed discussion of these three instruments. 
4.5.5. Endogenous P2 and Identification 
We use the percentage of new P2 adopters in the same industry (excluding the facility 
itself) and the percentage of P2 adopters in the same county (excluding the facility itself) in the 
previous period as instruments for the endogenous binary variable Adopt New P2. To instrument 
the endogenous Number of New P2s, we use the number of P2 technologies adopted by the 
facilities in the same county and in the same industry (defined by the 4-digit SIC code) in the last 
period. We expect these four variables to be correlated with the decision to adopt P2 by a facility 
due to information spillovers. Since they are based on the characteristics of other facilities, they 
are not directly correlated with the emissions of at the facility level, except through P2 adoption. 
Furthermore, the reporting of new P2 adoption started after the program participation and the 
33/50 program did not specify any abatement technology, therefore there is no reason to suspect 
that these variables on neighboring facilities would influence the facility’s decision to participate 
in the program.  
4.6 Data Description 
TRI provides chemical-specific releases34, recycling (on-site and off-site), incineration 
(on-site and off-site), and the number of new P2 adoptions at the facility level. From that, we 
generate data on 33/50 releases, 33/50 off-site recycling (including recycling and incineration), 
                                                 
34 Including onsite releases to air, water, injection to land, transfers to treatment and disposal 
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33/50 on-site recycling, number of P2s adopted, and HAP-TRI ratio. We then use the unique 
TRI-identifier for each facility to merge this dataset with facility-specific data on the numbers of 
inspections and penalties for compliance with mandatory air regulations from EPA’s AIRS 
Facility Subsystem (AFS) database (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007a). We obtain 
the list of 33/50 participating companies and information about the participation status of each of 
their facilities through personal communication with Hampshire Research.35 We are able to use 
the reported parent company names and Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) numbers to identify the 
33/50 participating companies and all their facilities in the TRI. This leads 4123 parent 
companies, of which 1203 parent companies participated in the 33/50 programs36. We then use 
the list of companies in (33/50 Program office, 1991; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
1992) to identify the first invitees of the program and their facilities in the TRI. In addition, we 
use the location of a facility in the TRI to merge the above data with the county’s median income 
from the 1990 census , the county’s attainment status (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2007b), and state-level scores on environmental legislations (League of Conservation Voters, 
2007 ) . 
Our final sample has 8756 facilities with 34339 observations for the period of 1991-1995. 
There are 5804 facilities that belong to 33/50 companies and only 23.6% of them actually 
participated in the program, rather than 100% assumption made by all previous studies. 
During the program period, 49.3% of the 33/50 facilities had adopted P2 at least once, 
while 36.7% of the non-participating facilities had adopted new P2 at least once. Table 4.1 
classifies facilities by number of P2 technologies adopted for program participants and non-
                                                 
35 Facility level participation data was obtained from Catherine Miller, Hampshire Research, www.hampshire.org. 
36 The EPA listed 1294 parent companies as participants in the 33/50 program in their final report in 1997. We were 
unable to find 91 of these parent company names in the 2004 release of TRI database (since some company names 
may have been updated by the EPA).  
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participants. We find that program participants tend to adopt more P2s than non-participants. For 
example, 17.4% of program participants reported to have adopted one P2 technology across all 
33/50 chemicals, while only 14.2% non-participants did so; 10.5% of program participants 
reported to have adopted 5 or more P2 technologies and only 6.4% of non-participants reported 
five or more P2 technologies.  
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the average levels of off-site and on-site recycling in the 
study period. Program participants emitted greater volumes of chemicals through on-site and off-
site recycling than non-participants. Both types of recycling activities increased from 1991 to 
1996. Off-site recycling increased steadily from 1991 to 1993, but dropped after 1994, especially 
for program participants.  
Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.2. We 
separate our sample into four groups: program participants and P2 adopters (P=1,T=1), program 
participants and non-adopters of P2 (P=1, T=0), non-participants and P2 adopters(P=0, T=1) , 
and non-participants and non-adopters of P2 (P=0, T=0). Table 4.2 shows that program 
participants adopted greater number of P2 technologies than the non-participants. Program 
participants were also greater emitters of direct releases and they undertook more on-site 
recycling and off-site recycling compared to the non-participants. Participants that had not 
adopted P2 had lower off-site recycling but higher on-site recycling compared to participants that 
had adopted P2. Only around 4.6% of the sample participated in the program and adopted P2 and 
the other 5% of the sample participated in the program but did not adopt P2.  
4.7 Results  
4.7.1. Effects of P2 and Program Participation on 33/50 Releases  
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Table 4.3 reports the effects of P2 adoption and program participation on 33/50 releases 
and toxicity-weighted 33/50 releases. All models use the whole set of instrumental variables 
directly, including the second lagged dependent variable, first invitation group, parent company’s 
prior change in 33/50 releases, facility’s share of total TRI releases, and the percentage of P2 
adopters in the same industry and in the same county.  
Alternatively, we use the number of new P2 adopted, instead of the binary P2 variable in 
the models reported in Table 4.4, to check for the robustness. To instrument the number of new 
P2 adopted, we use the average number of P2s adopted by the facilities in the same county and in 
the same industry (defined by the 4-digit SIC code) in the last period.  
Model I in Table 4.3 examines the effects of P2 and participation over the period of 
1991-1995, and Model II in Table 4.3 examines the effect of P2 and participation over the period 
of 1992-1996 (assuming participants remained in the program through 1996). We find that 
program participants had a greater rate of reduction in 33/50 releases as compared to the non-
participants and its statistically significant (Table 4.3, Row 2). This is consistent with the results 
in Chapter 2 on the effectiveness of the 33/50 program on 33/50 releases. Without taking into 
account the effect of the adoption of P2, the program participants had a 23% higher rate of 
reduction (Chapter 2, Table 2.4). Taking into account the effect of P2, the program participants 
had a 28% higher rate of reduction. This result indicates that program participation had a 
significant negative effect on 33/50 releases over and above the effect of P2. However, we do not 
find that adoption of P2 led to a reduction in 33/50 releases. Using the binary variable of P2 
adoption, we find that facilities that adopted P2 had a 35.6% lower rate of reduction in 33/50 
releases than facilities that did not adopt any P2 (Table 4.3, Row 3, Model I).   
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 Model III and IV examine the program’s effect on toxicity-weighted 33/50 releases in 
1991-1995 and 1992-1996 respectively. Similar to Model I and II, we find that adoption of P2 
did not significantly decrease the toxicity-weighted 33/50 releases and the program’s effect was 
still statistically significant and negative. This implies that the reductions of 33/50 releases and 
toxicity-weighted 33/50 releases were achieved primarily through abatement efforts other than 
P2.   
In Table 4.4, we use the number of P2s adopted instead of the binary P2 variable. We 
find that one additional P2 adopted led to a 7.6% increase in the change of 33/50 releases (Model 
V) and a 9.7% increase in change of toxicity weighted releases (Model VI. The effects of 
program participation were still statistically negative for the changes of 33/50 releases and 
toxicity-weighted releases. Program participants had 34.6% higher rate of reduction in 33/50 
releases than the non-participants, after taking into account of the number of P2s adopted..  
Since the facilities report the adoption of P2 on an annual basis, the exact timing of for P2 
to take effect is unclear. Harrington et al. (2008) use facility level data from all TRI facilities 
over the period of 1991-2001 and find that P2 adopted in the current period had no effect on 
toxic emissions. However they find that P2 adopted in the last period had a very small but 
significant negative impact on the toxic emissions of the current period. Nevertheless the impact 
of P2 is rather limited. For instance, a 1% one-time increase in P2 would result in a 0.032% 
reduction of releases and a 0.015% reduction of offsite recycling. To check the robustness of our 
results, we also use the P2 adopted in the last period instead of P2 adopted in the current period 
in the models37. However, that does not affect our conclusions. The magnitudes and directions of 
the estimated parameter are similar to the ones reported in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.  
                                                 
37 We include the lagged P2 variable and examine the effects of P2 and program participation for the period of 
1993-1996 using the same models as the ones reported in Table 4.3-Table 4.6. Using the lagged P2 leaves us to 
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Table 4.5 summarizes the results on the effects of P238 and program participation on 
releases of two groups of chemicals. Model IX indicates that the reduction of ODS releases was 
achieved by adopting P2, while participation did not have any significant effect. In contrast, 
adoption of P2 had no statistically significant impact on the change of non-OD releases and the 
reduction of non-OD releases was achieved through program participation (Model X). We use 
the number of P2s in Model XI and XII and find that an additional P2 technology led to 86% 
greater rate of reduction for OD chemicals (Model XI). But P2 adoption had no statistically 
significant impact on change in non-OD releases (Model XII).  
 In Chapter 2, we find that the program’s effect was statistically significant for non-OD 
releases and was not significant for OD releases (Table 2.5). We hypothesize that both program 
participants and non-participants had to reduce OD releases by regulation, which explains the 
finding. In this chapter, we find that the adoption of P2 had a significant negative effect on OD 
releases. This finding confirms our hypothesis in Chapter 2 that the reduction in OD releases was 
not directly due to program participation. Particularly the reduction of OD chemicals was 
achieved by adoption P2 technologies. 
4.7.2. Effects of P2 and Program Participation on Recycling of 33/50 Chemicals 
We report the estimates on change of recycling wastes in Table 4.6. Model XIII indicates 
that program participation led to a lower rate of change in total recycling. Specifically, the rate of 
change on offsite recycling for program participants was 58% lower than for the non-participants. 
Comparing the volume of offsite recycling wastes before and after the program, Gamper-
                                                                                                                                                             
analyze the effect of P2 on releases from 1993 onwards, since we also need to use the lagged P2 from the 
neighboring facilities as instruments for P2 adopted at the facility level.  
 
38 The number of P2 adopted for OD chemicals and the number of P2 adopted for non-OD chemicals are considered 
separately when we examine the P2 effects by groups of chemicals in Table 3.5. Accordingly, we use the percentage 
of P2 adopters for OD chemicals and for non-OD chemicals in the same industry and in the same county as 
instruments.  
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Rabindran (2006) finds that the increase of off-site recycling from program participants was 
statistically significantly greater than the increase from non-participants. However, she does not 
find program participants significantly reduced their 33/50 releases, except for two industry 
sectors.  If program paritipants substituted direct releases with off-site recycling, we would 
observe the changes in these two emissions go in oppsite directions. We find that although 
program participants sent greater amounts of wastes to recycling facilites and emmitted more 
releases than non-participants, their average rates of changes for off-site recycling and direct 
releases were much slower than for non-participants. Using the number of P2s, we find similar 
results on the effects of P2 and program participation (Model XV). The rate of increase was 51% 
lower for the participants (Model XVI). However, using either the number of P2s or the binary 
variable of P2 adoption, we do not find that the adoption of P2 significantly affected the change 
in off-site recycling (Model XVI and Model XVII, Row 2, and 3). This indicates that program 
participants might have used pollution control methods other than P2 to reduce both off-site 
recycling and releases.  
 We find the effects of HAP-TRI ratio and county median income on off-site recycling to 
be similar to 33/50 releases. Facilities emitted more HAP releases, and those located in counties 
with higher income reduced more off-site recycling. In Chapter 2, we find the number of 
inspections and state LCV scores were positively related to the program participation decision 
but we do not find the same consistent effects of them on 33/50 releases. However, we find 
facilities that received greater number of inspections and were located in a state with higher LCV 
scores transferred more 33/50 chemicals for off-site recycling. This result indicates that stronger 
regulatory pressures at the state and county level provided incentives for facilities to transfer 
their wastes to recycling facilities elsewhere. Additionally, we observe an upward trend of off-
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site recycling. The time dummies are statistically greater than 1 for all years, indicating every 
year there was a distinct increase.  
Neither program participation nor the adoption of P2 technologies had statistically 
significant impacts on change in on-site recycling (Model XV and XVIIII). Although variables 
approximating public pressures and regulatory pressures had statistically significant effects for 
33/50 releases and off-site recycling, they did not explain the change in on-site recycling. We 
also do not find there was a significant time trend in the change of on-site recycling.  
4.8 Conclusions 
Since both program participation and adoption of P2 technologies are not mandated, 
firms would only devote their efforts to these voluntary initiatives if they could benefit from 
them.  In Chapter 2, we have focused on the effectiveness of program participation in reducing 
releases. However, we have not examined the mechanisms through which the reduction was 
achieved. Firms could have resorted to P2 technologies to reduce pollution from source or used 
other abatement methods that were lower in the pollution control hierarchy and resulted in cross-
media substitution.  
This chapter examines the relationship between releases and P2 adoption, and examines 
the relationship between recycling and P2 adoption. We use facility- and time-specific program 
participation and P2 information and conduct the analysis for all 33/50 eligible facilities over the 
period of 1991-1995 (or over 1992-1996 in case of off-site and on-site recycling). We use GMM 
methods with instrumental variables to examine the effects of program participation and P2 
adoption on direct releases and on-site and off-site recycling after controlling for endogenous 
program participation, P2 adoption and path-dependence of emission generating process.  
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 We find that program participants did not increase transfers to recycling off-site. Despite 
an upward trend of increase in off-site recycling reported in TRI, we find evidence that the 
program participants experienced greater rate of reduction in off-site recycling. Additionally, 
program participants did not show a significant increase in on-site recycling compared to non-
participants. Consistent with our finding in Chapter 2, we find that program participants had 
greater rate of reduction in 33/50 releases than nonparticipants after controlling for the adoption 
of P2 technologies. These findings indicate that program participation did not cause an increase 
in total waste from the 33/50 chemicals, as emissions to all media did not increase as a result of 
the program.  
After controlling for other abatement methods through program participation, we find 
evidence that adoption of P2 slowed the rate of reduction in 33/50 releases. We gain additional 
understanding on the mechanisms of pollution reduction by conducing the analysis by OD 
chemicals and the rest of the 33/50 chemicals. Given mandatory phase out, facilities resorted to 
P2 technologies to reduce the use of OD chemicals. In contrast, the reduction of releases from 
the rest of the 33/50 chemicals was due to voluntary program participation.  
In sum, our findings indicate the interdependency among direct releases, recycling, and 
P2 methods. The reduction in 33/50 releases was achieved through methods that did not cause an 
increase in recycling. The effect of P2 technology on releases was ambiguous, except for OD 
chemicals that were to be eliminated. In the absence of a holistic approach to regulate toxic 
emissions to all environmental media, policies emphasizing voluntary P2 adoption may not lead 
to a decrease of total toxic pollution.  
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4.9 Tables and Figures  
Table 4.1 Distribution of Facilities by the Number of New P2 Technologies, 1991-1995. 
  
Percentage of Facilities 
Number of new P2 technologies 
adopted Non-participants Program Participants 
0 61.6 50.7 
1 14.2 17.4 
2 9.0 10.3 
3 4.5 5.6 
4 4.2 5.5 
5 and more 6.4 10.5 
Total 100 100 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics, 1991-1995. 
Variables P=0 & T=0 P=0 &T=1 P=1 & T=0 P=1& T=1
33/50 releases 
(million pounds) 0.060 0.101 0.093 0.138 
 (0.252) (0.302) (0.345) (0.437) 
Total recycling 0.513 1.942 0.564 1.634 
 (5.663) (24.235) (4.41) (10.037) 
Offsite recycling  
(million pounds) 0.180 0.236 0.373 0.211 
 (1.990) (1.407) (2.229) (0.841) 
Onsite recycling  
(million pounds) 0.586 1.235 0.794 1.362 
 (8.027) (15.400) (6.959) (9.574) 
Number of P2 adopted 0 3.0548 0 3.576 
 (0) (3.067) (0) (3.617) 
HAP-TRI ratio(Percentage) 74.616 78.021 72.189 75.992 
 (32.686) (29.631) (33.348) (30.450) 
Number of inspections 0.393 0.409 0.509 0.486 
 (1.219 (0.922) (1.348) (1.284) 
Percentage of P2 adopters  
of the same county 0.189 0.383 0.310 0.383 
 (0.208 (0.252) (0.170) (0.172) 
Percentage of P2  
adopters of the same industry 0.177 0.340 0.298 0.328 
 (0.248) (0.258) (0.237) 0.247) 
Average P2 adopted by  
others in the same industry  49.574 104.818 50.692 135.704 
 (124.515) (174.106) (123.92) (226.921)
Average P2 adopted by others in the same county 
 0.5606 0.986 0.582 1.151 
 (0.95) (1.075) (1.089) (1.328) 
Share in total TRI releases of parent company 
(percentage) 0.316 0.327 0.467 0.475 
  (0.404 (0.395) (0.451) (0.500) 
Firm prior change in 33/50 releases(million pounds) -0.350 -0.411 -0.934 -0.860 
 (1.146) (1.269) (2.404) (2.206) 
First invitation group  
(percentage) 0.361 0.394 0.496 0.475 
 (0.480) (0.489) (0.500) (0.500) 
County non-attainment status 0.935 1.045 1.130 1.181 
 (1.1209) (1.195) (1.139) (1.147) 
LCV score 95.785 98.412 100.585 102.312 
 (38.987) (39.089) (39.096) (36.951) 
Number of Observations 20471 12965 1837 1729 
Number of Facilities 6765 695 5263 695 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. We define T=1 if a facility ever adopted any P2 technology in 1991-1995, 
and 0 otherwise. P=1 if a facility participated in the program in 1991-1995 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4.3 Effects of Program Participation and P2 Adoption on 33/50 Releases, 1991-1996. 
Variables  
I 
 
33/50 releases 
II 
 
33/50 releases 
III 
Toxicity  
weighted releases 
IV 
Toxicity  
weighted releases 
Lagged releases 0.588*** 0.513*** 0.716*** 0.653*** 
 [0.060] [0.060] [0.061] [0.061] 
Program participation -0.289** -0.245** -0.469*** -0.385** 
 [0.113] [0.100] [0.163] [0.152] 
Adopt P2 (binary) 0.356* 0.049 0.261 -0.024 
 [0.199] [0.191] [0.263] [0.268] 
HAP-TRI -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Number of inspections -0.007 -0.004 -0.012 -0.006 
 [0.012] [0.010] [0.021] [0.016] 
LCV score 0.003 0.005** 0.004 0.005 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
LCV score squared 0 -0.000** 0 0 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Non-attainment status 0.028 0.005 0.058 0.037 
 [0.033] [0.047] [0.051] [0.075] 
County median income -0.099*** -0.087*** -0.062 -0.049 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.043] [0.043] 
Year 1991 0.622**  0.271  
 [0.294]  [0.425]  
Year 1992 0.806*** 0.820*** 0.48 0.433 
 [0.292] [0.285] [0.423] [0.424] 
Year 1993 0.702** 0.731*** 0.329 0.294 
 [0.292] [0.283] [0.422] [0.422] 
Year 1994 0.835*** 0.839*** 0.565 0.495 
 [0.292] [0.283] [0.421] [0.421] 
Year 1995 0.763*** 0.757*** 0.526 0.44 
 [0.292] [0.283] [0.422] [0.420] 
Year 1996  0.782***  0.438 
  [0.285]  [0.423] 
SIC 26: Paper  0.031 -0.024 0.04 -0.022 
 [0.030] [0.028] [0.037] [0.037] 
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Table 4.3 (Cont.)     
Variables 
I 
 
33/50 releases 
II 
 
33/50 releases 
III 
Toxicity  
weighted releases 
IV 
Toxicity  
weighted releases 
     
SIC 28: Chemical 0.079*** 0.033 0.059* 0.036 
 [0.024] [0.023] [0.031] [0.033] 
SIC 29: Petroleum 0.041 0.051* 0.017 0.088* 
 [0.033] [0.030] [0.046] [0.045] 
SIC 30: Rubber -0.004 -0.008 -0.055 -0.043 
 [0.026] [0.029] [0.036] [0.042] 
SIC 33: Primary metal 0.085* 0.02 -0.022 -0.027 
 [0.048] [0.046] [0.071] [0.074] 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal 0.037 -0.023 -0.06 -0.065 
 [0.034] [0.032] [0.048] [0.051] 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer -0.04 -0.035 -0.156*** -0.086 
 [0.038] [0.037] [0.058] [0.064] 
SIC 36:Electronics -0.113*** -0.123*** -0.191*** -0.182*** 
 [0.029] [0.030] [0.044] [0.046] 
SIC 37:Transportation -0.008 -0.049* -0.072* -0.106** 
 [0.025] [0.027] [0.038] [0.044] 
SIC 38: Instruments -0.127** -0.075 -0.247*** -0.092 
 [0.054] [0.052] [0.087] [0.085] 
Number of facilities 8756 8119 34,339 32,069 
Observations 34,339 32,069 8756 8119 
R-squared -0.498 -0.422 -0.652 -0.578 
Hansen' J statistics 11.62 9.005 13.47* 13.39** 
Number of over identified conditions 7 6 7 6 
Weak ID test 10.08** 9.679** 12.87*** 11.63*** 
 
Note: Model I and III examine the period of 1991-1995 while Model II and IV examine the period of 1992-1996 
(assuming program participants remained in the program in 1996). We use GMM with instrumental variables for the 
lagged dependent variable and endogenous program participation and P2 adoption variables, using a pooled panel 
dataset.  The adoption of P2 is defined as a binary choice. Robust standard errors are in brackets and they are 
clustered at the facility level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.4 Alternative Specifications Evaluating the Effects of P2 and Program 
Participation on 33/50 Releases and Toxicity Weighted Releases, 1991-1996.  
 Variables 
V 
33/50  
releases
VI 
Toxicity  
weighted releases
VII 
33/50  
releases 
VIII 
Toxicity  
weighted releases
Lagged releases 0.591*** 0.747*** 0.553*** 0.705*** 
 [0.036] [0.036] [0.039] [0.039] 
Program participation -0.346*** -0.595*** -0.275*** -0.420*** 
 [0.113] [0.173] [0.100] [0.157] 
Number of P2s  0.076*** 0.097*** 0.037* 0.048 
 [0.019] [0.027] [0.020] [0.029] 
HAP-TRI -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
Number of inspections -0.008 -0.015 -0.005 -0.008 
 [0.012] [0.021] [0.010] [0.016] 
LCV score 0.003 0.004 0.005** 0.005 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] 
LCV score squared 0 0 -0.000** 0 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Non-attainment status 0.031 0.056 0.006 0.036 
 [0.032] [0.051] [0.048] [0.077] 
County median income -0.092*** -0.062 -0.089*** -0.056 
 [0.028] [0.042] [0.028] [0.042] 
Year 1991 0.604** 0.25   
 [0.291] [0.435]   
Year 1992 0.792*** 0.465 0.822*** 0.435 
 [0.289] [0.433] [0.286] [0.427] 
Year 1993 0.687** 0.319 0.732*** 0.297 
 [0.289] [0.432] [0.284] [0.425] 
Year 1994 0.813*** 0.554 0.842*** 0.507 
 [0.289] [0.431] [0.283] [0.424] 
Year 1995 0.739** 0.519 0.763*** 0.461 
 [0.289] [0.431] [0.284] [0.424] 
Year 1996   0.794*** 0.464 
   [0.285] [0.426] 
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Table 4.4 (Cont.)     
Variables  
V 
33/50  
releases
VI 
Toxicity  
weighted releases
VII 
33/50  
releases 
VIII 
Toxicity  
weighted releases
SIC 26: Paper  0.058* 0.075* -0.018 -0.014 
 [0.030] [0.040] [0.029] [0.039] 
SIC 28: Chemical 0.042** 0.019 0.019 0.024 
 [0.021] [0.030] [0.021] [0.029] 
SIC 29: Petroleum -0.036 -0.08 0.011 0.04 
 [0.041] [0.058] [0.037] [0.058] 
SIC 30: Rubber 0.011 -0.043 -0.006 -0.039 
 [0.026] [0.036] [0.028] [0.041] 
SIC 33: Primary metal 0.081** 0.018 0.038 0.024 
 [0.032] [0.048] [0.031] [0.049] 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal 0.047* -0.027 -0.008 -0.029 
 [0.028] [0.041] [0.028] [0.042] 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer -0.025 -0.117** -0.015 -0.038 
 [0.034] [0.052] [0.033] [0.055] 
SIC 36:Electronics -0.075** -0.145*** -0.107*** -0.152*** 
 [0.031] [0.047] [0.032] [0.049] 
SIC 37:Transportation -0.003 -0.064 -0.049* -0.095** 
 [0.025] [0.039] [0.027] [0.044] 
SIC 38: Instruments -0.082 -0.199** -0.063 -0.075 
 [0.052] [0.088] [0.051] [0.087] 
Number of facilities 8756 34,339 8119 32,069 
Observations 34,339 8756 32,069 8119 
R-squared -0.501 -0.708 -0.48 -0.664 
Hansen' J statistics 13.14* 16.21** 9.791 13.44** 
Number of over identified conditions 7 7 6 6 
Weak ID test 13.84** 17.76*** 15.64** 18.49*** 
 
Note: Different from Table 4.3 in which a binary variable of P2 adoption is used, all models use the number of P2 
adopted as an explanatory variable. We use GMM with instrumental variables for the lagged dependent variable and 
endogenous program participation, and P2 adoption variables, using a pooled panel dataset. We perform GMM with 
instrumental variables to estimate the above models on a pooled panel dataset. Robust standard errors in brackets 
(clustered at facility level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.5 Effects of Program Participation and P2 adoption on OD releases, and Non-OD 
Releases, 1992-1996.  
Variables  IX OD releases
X 
Non-OD releases
XI 
OD releases 
XII 
Non-OD releases
Lagged releases 0.602*** 0.407*** 0.656*** 0.429*** 
 [0.033] [0.068] [0.032] [0.047] 
Program participation -0.044 -0.137 0.018 -0.128 
 [0.104] [0.113] [0.105] [0.108] 
Adopt P2 (binary) -1.759*** -0.026   
 [0.181] [0.213]   
Number of P2s    -0.861*** 0.006 
   [0.104] [0.020] 
HAP-TRI -0.001 -0.007*** -0.001* -0.007*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of Inspections -0.001 0.001 0 0 
 [0.015] [0.010] [0.016] [0.010] 
LCV score -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] 
LCV score squared 0 -0.000** 0 -0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Non attainment status 0.067 0.002 0.061 0.007 
 [0.055] [0.051] [0.056] [0.051] 
County median income 0.067* -0.069** 0.053 -0.069** 
 [0.034] [0.032] [0.036] [0.031] 
Year 1992 -0.660* 0.626* -0.546 0.621* 
 [0.346] [0.346] [0.358] [0.322] 
Year 1993 -0.765** 0.790** -0.646* 0.780** 
 [0.347] [0.346] [0.359] [0.321] 
Year 1994 -0.671* 0.680* -0.543 0.668** 
 [0.348] [0.351] [0.360] [0.322] 
Year 1995 -0.658* 0.529 -0.528 0.518 
 [0.350] [0.349] [0.362] [0.322] 
Year 1996 -0.654* 0.613* -0.516 0.608* 
 [0.350] [0.345] [0.362] [0.321] 
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Table 4.5 (Cont.)     
Variables 
IX 
OD releases
X 
Non-OD releases
XI 
OD releases 
XII 
Non-OD releases
SIC 26: Paper  -0.007 -0.067** -0.009 -0.071** 
 [0.036] [0.031] [0.034] [0.032] 
SIC 28: Chemical -0.001 -0.011 0.006 -0.015 
 [0.022] [0.024] [0.023] [0.021]  
SIC 29: Petroleum -0.091* 0.029 -0.088* 0.02  
 [0.048] [0.030] [0.052] [0.035]  
SIC 30: Rubber -0.104*** 0.061* -0.124*** 0.059*  
 [0.039] [0.036] [0.039] [0.035] 
SIC 33: Primary metal -0.049* 0.019 -0.04 0.023 
 [0.026] [0.048] [0.027] [0.033] 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal -0.038 0.032 -0.03 0.034 
 [0.025] [0.034] [0.025] [0.030] 
SIC 35: Machinery & computer -0.078** 0.034 -0.080** 0.036 
 [0.035] [0.041] [0.035] [0.038] 
SIC 36:Electronics -0.054 -0.05 -0.058 -0.049 
 [0.035] [0.035] [0.037] [0.036] 
SIC 37:Transportation 0.022 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.037] [0.034] [0.038] [0.032] 
SIC 38: Instruments 0.182** 0.081 0.202** 0.078 
 [0.078] [0.053] [0.090] [0.053] 
Number of facilities 8119 8119 8119 8119 
Observations 32,069 32,069 32,069 32,069 
R-squared -0.475 -0.306 -0.548 -0.332 
Hansen' J statistics 98.39*** 12.66* 99.78*** 11.18* 
Number of over identified conditions 6 6 6 6 
Weak ID test 38.22*** 8.818* 33.92*** 17.6*** 
Note: Models IX and X use the binary variable of P2 as explanatory variable and Models XI and XII use the number 
of P2 adopted as explanatory variable . We perform GMM with instrumental variables for the lagged releases, 
program participation and P2 adoption variables. The estimations are conducted on a pooled panel  
dataset. Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered at facility level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.6 Effects of P2 and Program Participation on Recycling, 1992-1996.  
Variables 
XIII 
Total  
recycle  
XIV 
Offsite  
recycle  
XV 
Onsite  
recycle 
XVI 
Total  
recycle 
XVII 
Offsite  
recycle 
XVIII 
Onsite 
 recycle 
Program participation -0.490** -0.588*** 0.234 -0.373* -0.521*** 0.134 
 [0.209] [0.210] [0.212] [0.192] [0.195] [0.200] 
Adopt new P2 (binary) 0.610* 0.29 -0.208    
 [0.337] [0.349] [0.351]    
Number of P2s     0.056 0.025 0.03 
    [0.036] [0.038] [0.041] 
HAP-TRI -0.003*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Number of inspections -0.003*** 0.027** 0.001 0.011 0.027** 0 
 [0.001] [0.013] [0.014] [0.011] [0.013] [0.014] 
LCV score 0.005** 0.006** 0.004 0.005* 0.005* 0.004 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
LCV score squared 0 0 -0.000* 0 0 -0.000* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Non attainment status -0.049 -0.082 -0.035 -0.037 -0.076 -0.038 
 [0.058] [0.063] [0.060] [0.057] [0.062] [0.060] 
County median income -0.198*** -0.175*** -0.026 -0.170*** -0.162*** -0.052 
 [0.056] [0.057] [0.058] [0.049] [0.051] [0.053] 
Year 1992 1.830*** 1.794*** 0.418 1.726*** 1.759*** 0.55 
 [0.526] [0.530] [0.543] [0.500] [0.513] [0.532] 
Year 1993 1.748*** 1.773*** 0.242 1.635*** 1.733*** 0.38 
 [0.526] [0.531] [0.544] [0.499] [0.512] [0.531] 
Year 1994 1.727*** 1.732*** 0.224 1.603*** 1.686*** 0.368 
 [0.527] [0.531] [0.545] [0.499] [0.511] [0.531] 
Year 1995 1.618*** 1.596*** 0.204 1.480*** 1.543*** 0.359 
 [0.530] [0.535] [0.548] [0.499] [0.512] [0.532] 
Year 1996 1.557*** 1.452*** 0.245 1.419*** 1.401*** 0.403 
 [0.532] [0.537] [0.549] [0.500] [0.514] [0.533] 
SIC 26: Paper  -0.027 -0.024 -0.011 -0.02 -0.021 -0.006 
 [0.056] [0.060] [0.075] [0.053] [0.059] [0.076] 
SIC 28: Chemical 0.175*** 0.117*** 0.067 0.128*** 0.096** 0.070* 
 [0.043] [0.043] [0.046] [0.038] [0.039] [0.041] 
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Table 4.6 (Cont.)       
Variables 
XIII 
Total 
recycle  
XIV 
Offsite  
recycle  
XV 
Onsite  
recycle 
XVI 
Total 
recycle 
XVII 
Offsite recycle 
XVIII 
Onsite  
recycle 
SIC 29: Petroleum 0.169** 0.109* 0.157** 0.112 0.088 0.127 
 [0.067] [0.064] [0.071] [0.076] [0.075] [0.083] 
SIC 30: Rubber 0.027 -0.055 0.166*** 0.056 -0.041 0.161*** 
 [0.052] [0.050] [0.051] [0.048] [0.048] [0.049] 
SIC 33: Primary metal 0.341*** 0.245*** 0.033 0.267*** 0.209*** 0.098 
 [0.085] [0.085] [0.085] [0.060] [0.060] [0.060] 
SIC 34: Fabricated metal 0.269*** 0.184*** -0.03 0.241*** 0.170*** 0.004 
 [0.053] [0.053] [0.055] [0.044] [0.044] [0.046] 
SIC 35: Machinery 
 & computer 0.152*** 0.047 -0.056 0.139*** 0.038 -0.026 
 [0.056] [0.055] [0.055] [0.052] [0.052] [0.053] 
SIC 36:Electronics 0.04 0.026 -0.086 0.075 0.043 -0.078 
 [0.048] [0.052] [0.056] [0.048] [0.053] [0.059] 
SIC 37:Transportation 0.072 0.023 -0.055 0.081* 0.027 -0.059 
 [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.045] [0.046] [0.047] 
SIC 38: Instruments -0.035 -0.007 0.002 0.041 0.032 -0.025 
 [0.081] [0.079] [0.110] [0.065] [0.064] [0.102] 
Number of facilities 8119 8119 8119 8119 8119 8119 
Observations 32,069 32,069 32,069 32,069 32,069 32,069 
R-squared -0.013 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Hansen' J statistics 1.838 1.789 6.763* 4.523 4.194 7.397* 
Number of 
 over identified conditions 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Weak ID test 15.68*** 15.68*** 15.68*** 19.95*** 15.68*** 19.95*** 
Note: Models XIII and XV use the binary variable of P2 as explanatory variable and Models XVI and XVIII use the 
number of P2 adopted as explanatory variable. We perform GMM with instrumental variables for program 
participation and the P2 variables to estimate using a pooled panel dataset. Robust standard errors in brackets 
(clustered at facility level).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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 Figure 4.1 Average Off-site Recycling, 1991-1996. 
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Figure 4.2 Average On-site Recycling, 1991-1996. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
Complex industrial manufacturing activities use millions of pounds of toxic chemicals 
every year in the U.S. Though the usage, storage, and disposal of those toxic chemicals could 
pose potential environmental and health risks, designing and enforcing mandates on numerous 
production processes and toxic pollutants could be administratively difficult and costly to the 
regulators. Instead, the government has sought to use more cost effective and incentive-based 
policy instruments to encourage environmental stewardship among firms. In response to the 
deadly chemical leak in Bhopal, India and serious chemical release accident in West Virginia, 
the U.S. government has mandated public information disclosure on the usage, disposal and 
emissions of toxic chemicals, to increase industry transparency and public awareness. 
Additionally, the government has also initiated voluntary programs, established information 
exchange platforms and invested in outreach efforts to promote P2 technology to reduce toxic 
emissions.  
This dissertation examines the effects of information and incentive based approaches on a 
firm’s environmental performances and the firm’s adoption of environmental technology. In 
Chapter 2, we evaluate the effectiveness of the EPA’s voluntary 33/50 program in reducing the 
33/50 releases. We analyze 8756 facilities, over the period of 1991-1999, using dynamic panel 
data models to incorporate facility specific unobserved effects, path dependence of the emissions 
generating process and timing of participation, while controlling for endogeneity of program 
participation. Results show that the program reduced overall and toxicity-weighted 33/50 
releases, but the effect is much smaller compared to estimation using firm-level participation 
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data. We also find that the program effect differed across the 17 chemicals. The program had a 
statistically insignificant impact on two ozone-depleting chemicals, but a statistically significant 
negative impact on the remaining 15 chemicals. 
In Chapter 3, we examine the extent to which information spillovers motivated the 
adoption of P2 technologies. We further examine the extent to which program participation 
increased the adoption of P2 technologies for participants and whether higher participation ratio 
in the neighborhood was associated with greater P2 adoption. We conduct the empirical analysis 
on 6974 facilities that were eligible for the 33/50 program from 1991 to 1995. We estimate the 
number of P2 technologies adopted for 33/50 chemicals and other TRI chemicals at the facility 
level with respect to program participation, compliance costs to regulations, prior P2 experience 
by the neighbors on the respective chemicals, and the program participation ratio in the 
neighborhood. We address the endogeneity of program participation with instrumental variables, 
and control for location and industry fixed effects. We find that facilities were more likely to 
learn about adoption of P2 technologies from their industry peers. The direct impact of program 
participation was only evident for 33/50 chemicals. The presence of program participants did not 
significantly motivate P2 adoption in the neighborhood.  
In Chapter 4, we examine the extent to which program participation led 33/50 facilities to 
use recycling methods and the extent to which P2 adoption led to reductions in releases and 
recycling of 33/50 chemicals. We undertake this analysis using the same sample as in Chapter 2. 
We evaluate three outcomes of interest: on-site recycling, off-site recycling and direct releases 
while controlling for endogenous program participation and P2 adoption as well as the effects of 
various regulatory and public pressures on facilities to reduce 33/50 releases. Consistent with our 
finding in Chapter 2, we find that program participants had greater rate of reduction in 33/50 
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releases than nonparticipants after controlling for the adoption of P2 technologies. Despite an 
upward trend of increase in off-site recycling reported in TRI, we find evidence that the program 
participants experienced lower rate of increase in off-site recycling. Additionally, program 
participants did not show a significant increase in on-site recycling compared to non-participants. 
These findings indicate that program participation did not cause an increase in total emissions 
from the 33/50 chemicals, as emissions to all media did not increase as a result of the program. 
However, after controlling for program participation, the adoption of P2 technology did not 
reduce releases and recycling of 33/50 chemicals, except for the releases of ozone depleting 
chemicals. The reduction in releases of ozone depleting chemicals was due to adoption of P2 
technologies instead of directly due to program participation.  
5.2 Implications for Future Research and Policy  
Previous studies on the effectiveness of the 33/50 program have yielded mixed results. 
These studies have used data aggregated at the firm level or assumed that all facilities were 
program participants if their parent companies had participated in the program. In Chapter 2, we 
find that there was great extent of heterogeneity among facilities of the same parent companies. 
With a firm with multiple plants, we find that the incentives to participate in the program were 
greatly reduced once one of the plants had participated in the program. We show that making the 
same assumption as previous studies leads to an attenuated estimate of the program’s effect. 
Since TRI facilities meet the minimum reporting thresholds, they are larger emitters of toxic 
pollutants, and therefore are more likely to make decisions on emissions, program participation, 
and technology adoption at the facility level. Thus, our study highlights the importance of 
undertaking the analysis at a disaggregated level for future studies using data from the TRI. 
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Although program participants had reduced more 33/50 releases than non-participants, 
we find in Chapter 4 that the reduction was not directly achieved through P2 adoption. 
Policymakers have emphasized their preference for P2 over other abatement methods in the 
pollution control hierarchy. However, we do not find evidence that the adoption of P2 reduced 
33/50 releases or recycling, except for ozone depleting chemicals. To the best of our knowledge, 
Harrington et al. (2008) is the only other empirical evaluation of the effect of P2 on toxic 
emissions. The authors use facility level data from all TRI facilities over the period of 1991-2001 
and find that current period P2 adoptions had no effect on toxic emissions. Although they find 
that one-year lagged P2 significantly reduced toxic emissions of the current period, the 
magnitude of the impact was very small. Both our analysis and that of Harrington et al. (2008) 
suggest that P2 technologies may not significantly decrease total toxic pollution, since it may 
have enabled firms to produce more output through increasing production efficiency. Our 
findings thus suggest that voluntary P2 efforts may not lead to a decrease in total toxic emissions 
without a cap on total toxic emissions.  
Our analysis of the adoption of P2 for 33/50 chemicals and other chemicals by 33/50- 
eligible facilities show that facilities in the same industry were more likely to learn from each 
other, but facilities from the same county were less likely to do so. This result suggests that, in 
the TRI dataset, there could be greater similarities between industry neighbors than between 
geographic neighbors. Thus, facilities might have stronger incentives to adopt P2 either to 
imitate their industry peers or to learn how to better use a technology from industry peers. Due to 
data limitation, we have assumed that facilities in the same industry and in the same county are 
more likely to learn from each other, and we have treated the neighbors from the same county 
and the same industry as equally important. Our results suggest two possible extensions that 
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future studies could explore. First, information from industry peers should probably be given 
greater weight than information from the geographic neighbors when examining adoption and 
diffusion of environmental technology. Second, we do not have information on the supply chains 
through which facilities are connected. Within the same industry, facilities may have learned 
more from the peers with whom they share common suppliers or end-users. Thus, those peers 
should be given greater weight than the rest of the facilities in the industry. Future policies to 
encourage information exchange should thus focus on those firms that are most related to each 
other.  
Furthermore, existing literature also shows that there are two types of information 
generated by early adopters: information on how to effectively use a new technology and 
information on the benefit of the new technology (Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Oster and Thornton, 
2009). The former tends to increase the adoption rate, especially when a technology is difficult to 
use but the benefit is certain. The effect of the latter depends on the effectiveness of the 
technology. Our data do not allow us to distinguish between these types of information. Future 
research could provide more insights on the role of information spillover on environmental 
technology adoption by investigating the two types of information explicitly. For example, future 
research could identify two types of technologies: technologies with uncertain performance and 
technologies that are difficult to use, to compare the effects of spillovers on the adoption of these 
technologies.  
5.3 Final Remarks on Voluntary Program 
As the first public voluntary initiative, the 33/50 program has been extensively studied by 
scholars. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the role of the 33/50 program in motivating 
pollution reduction, adoption of P2 technologies, and inducing adoption of P2 technologies 
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among neighboring facilities. The 33/50 program motivated the reduction of 33/50 releases and 
reduced the rate of increase in off-site recycling. Program participation also motivated the 
adoption of P2 technologies for 33/50 chemicals but not for other TRI chemicals. Facilities were 
not motivated to adopt more P2 technologies even if there were more participants in their 
geographic and industrial networks. Despite the policy emphasis on P2, the adoption of P2 
technologies did not reduce toxic releases, except for ozone depleting chemicals that were to be 
phased out. We conclude that the effects of the 33/50 program were limited to the targeted 
chemicals and program participants. Thus voluntary programs by themselves may not be a 
sufficient to address a wide range of toxic pollution problems and induce diffusion of 
environmental technology.  
Our findings suggest that future voluntary policies could be improved in two ways. First, 
the 33/50 program had a clear cap on direct releases but did not specify reduction in total toxic 
wastes. Policy makers could set up a cap on total toxic emissions (including releases, recycling, 
and disposal) for the chemicals39 with higher toxicity to reduce the overall dependence on those 
chemicals and induce environmental technology change. Second, the 33/50 program was 
intended to encourage the P2 ethic but did not set up mechanisms to systematically measure the 
progress and the effectiveness of P2 technology. Though EPA published a few successful cases 
on reduction efforts in the 33/50 program report (U.S Environmental Protection Agency, 1995), 
it remains unclear the extent to which those process innovations and modifications were 
disseminated among program participants. Furthermore, the existing reporting of P2 activities in 
the TRI may not be sufficient since it does not indicate when those activities are effectively 
implemented or even discontinued. Future voluntary programs on toxic pollutions could utilize 
                                                 
39 The EPA has evaluated the toxicity characterization for chemicals of High Production Volume, and set up 
challenge program to challenge firms to make the data on these chemicals public available. A cap on these HPV 
chemicals could be considered.  
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the existing P2 information clearinghouse to record the progress in adoption and implementation 
of new technologies. Last, the effect of information spillover depends on the effectiveness of the 
new technology. To effectively disseminate a new technology, future voluntary programs could 
provide information subsidies to a few early adopters in order to observe the effectiveness of the 
new technologies and identify the most effective technologies. To leverage the effect of 
information spillover, future programs could target those information subsides to companies that 
are closely related to other firms in their respective industries.  
In the absence of a regulation on Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the EPA initiated the 
GHG Reporting Program in 2010. Starting in 2011, major sources of CO2 emissions are required 
to disclose their emissions through the program that covers more than 10,000 facilities in the U.S. 
The program “intends to provide accurate and timely data to inform future climate policies 
without requiring control of GHG” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010c). Our study 
on the 33/50 program, TRI and P2 may have the following implications for future policies GHG 
reduction policies in the U.S.  
First, firms were motivated to reduce their toxic emissions following the first publication 
of the TRI. It is likely that the disclosure of GHG emissions could also motivate voluntary offset 
efforts and provide incentives for firms to participate in a voluntary program to reduce GHG 
emissions. Additionally, the accurate reporting and publication of GHG emissions could provide 
a foundation to establish a voluntary carbon market. With the publication of GHG emissions, 
larger emitters may have stronger incentives to voluntarily report their abatement and participate 
in offset markets in order to reduce pressures from consumers and environmental groups. There 
could also be an increasing trend of third party verification on offset efforts.  Evidence shows 
that third party certification on the environmental management system instilled changes in 
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environmental management philosophy and practices (Arimura, et al., 2008; Harrington, et al., 
2008; Sam, et al., 2008). To push for further reduction in GHG emissions, EPA could include 
those voluntary efforts in the GHG reporting system, provided that they meet third party 
verification.  
Second, unlike other unsuccessful voluntary programs, the 33/50 program can be 
evaluated because its baseline and the outcome are both measurable using the existing toxic 
releases data in the TRI. The establishment of the GHG reporting program could provide policy 
makers with the necessary baseline information on GHG emissions to design voluntary programs 
to control GHG emissions. However, the current GHG reporting system excludes activities such 
as CO2 injections and geological sequestration. Though these methods prevent CO2 from being 
released into the atmosphere, large emitters may have stronger incentives to reduce their total 
reported quantity by claiming that they are using CO2 injections and geological sequestration to 
limit their actual environmental releases. Following the example of the TRI that includes 
recycling and direct releases, the reporting system could create two separate categories: total 
GHG emissions directly released to the environment and GHG released through injection and 
sequestration. This would provide a complete baseline on the total GHG generated to the 
researchers, environmental groups and the public.  
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